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INTRODUCTION

For many low-income developing countries, with limited natural resources to
competitively trade globally, tourism often serves as a vital economic driver. To that end,
governments of these nations will make attempts to attract private sector investment, to generate
tourist arrivals and travel receipts, with the hopes that an abundance of tourism development will
create linkages with other sectors to produce growth in their economy. The reliance on this
industry is paradoxical, as governments of many poor nations habitually underestimate their role
as the key stakeholder in determining the acute strategies which will attract, grow, and retain
tourism demand. Furthermore, government leaders, of developing countries, may desire to
generate economic growth through tourism channels; however, they fail to consider that tourism
is as particularly sensitive to political factors as it is to economic and environmental ones.
Moreover, governments must understand that their country projects an image that potential
investors and tourists may perceive as feasible for investment and travel. The global perception
of a country is partially exogenous and beyond a government’s control. However, there are
preemptive measures that governments can take, to attract tourism, to contribute to a positive
perception of their country as a viable travel destination. Developing countries’ governments,
who are successful at generating a thriving tourism sector, work to create safe and stable political
environments, invest a tremendous amount of state capital in tourism sustainability, hire
destination managers, execute sound tourism public policies, and consult with public relation
firms to assist in the process. Conversely, governments who fail at fostering a sustainable
tourism industry, and remain in economic jeopardy, can attribute as reasons political instability,
insufficient security policies, and deficient tourism promotion strategies, along with a lack of
capital expenditure investment in developing quality infrastructure.
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1.1 Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to advance the tourism determinants literature by 1)
evaluating the effectiveness of government institutions in generating higher levels of tourism
arrivals and receipts in two test countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic; and 2) providing a
more comprehensive theory and methodology for measuring security, infrastructure, and
marketing promotions’ impact on tourism demand. The main question I seek to answer in this
paper is what difference do the government institutions for each country make in producing
tourism growth? Ultimately, I expect the answer to this question to solve the conundrum for
why Haiti’s once thriving tourism sector deteriorated while the Dominican Republic’s tourism
industry sustained even though both countries, respectively, endured similar political and
socioeconomic challenges.
1.2 Background on Tourism in Haiti and the Dominican Republic
In a 2004 economic and sector study regional report by the Inter-American Development
Bank, the history of tourism in Haiti is outlined and the sector is categorized as having uneven
development that was marred by many “setbacks” (Lundhal, 2004). Tourism began in mid-1940
with around 5,000 visitors (Lundhal, 2004); and, by 1956, Haiti had reached 67,700 travelers
(Séraphin, 2011). During the 1950s and early 1960s, Haiti was perceived by travelers as a good
place to visit. And, subsequently, during that time, Haiti experienced one of the fastest growth
rate of visitors in the Caribbean (Séraphin, 2011). Travelers to Haiti preferred visiting the island
compared to its neighbor, the Dominican Republic, which was not yet known as a worthy travel
destination (Séraphin, 2011). However, violent unrest during the cruel dictatorship of Francois
“Papa Doc” Duvalier led to a sharp decline in visitors in 1963. After that, Haiti was considered
unsafe by travelers and a country to avoid. The negative country perception ended when Jean
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Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier became president in 1972; and, tourism experienced a revival.
Tourist numbers peaked to 300,000 visitors by 1980 (Steif, 1985; Fass, 1988). However, this
upsurge was temporary as a rumor developed in 1982 that AIDS originated in Haiti; and, then
Duvalier’s dictatorship was overthrown in 1986. Except for cruise ship tourism in Labadee,
Haiti’s mass tourism potential collapsed after the 1986 coup; and, a series of political and socioeconomic problems began to plague Haiti that had lasting effects well into late 2010. In late
2010, after a 7.0 earthquake hit the country, the Haitian government began making serious
efforts to revitalize tourism (Séraphin, 2011). Foreign investors began constructing hotels in
Haiti to cater to the country’s new brand of travelers: aid workers, missionaries and business
people. There is now legitimate hope that the country may finally capture a small portion of the
mass tourism market of overnight visitors.
Around the time that Haiti’s tourism sector was first developing in the 1940s, the
neighboring Dominican Republic’s tourism industry was non-existent. The 1960 Fodor's Guide
to the Caribbean, Bahamas and Bermuda (1960) offered an extensive 29-page review of Haiti as
a travel destination and classified it as "most exotic, very rewarding, plenty of accommodations
from simple, low-budget to luxurious" (p. xxii; Fuller, 1999). Meanwhile, the 9-page
assessment of the Dominican Republic was that it had 56 revolutions and 43 presidents between
1844 to 1930; and, the country was considered a "comic opera prototype of Caribbean
instability" (Fodor, 1960). Furthermore, in its discussion of the Dominican tourism office, Fodor
described that the "Direccion Genereral de Turismo" (328) was "the only official tourist office in
the Caribbean which seems to us to fail consistently in its task of promoting tourism. Its
inefficiency is lamentable. Its standards of courtesy, far below the normal Dominican level...The
office's policy...does not seem to be aimed at facilitating travel or the circulation of information
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about the republic's tourists’ suggestions...We cannot deplore too strongly the uncooperative
attitude and the general inefficiency..." (Fodor, 328). By 1967, when the Dominican government
had commenced taking significant steps to build tourism, Haiti's tourism industry had
experienced strong growth (Fuller, 1999). However, at present, there is a stark contrast between
the flourishing mass tourism sector of the Dominican Republic which had 5,959,300 million
stay-over arrivals (with 335,000 cruise ship arrivals) in 2016 (WEF Report on the Dominican
Republic, 2018). In 2016, Haiti’s small niche market of visitors received 515,804 stay-over
arrivals (with 673,501 cruise ship passengers) (WEF Report on Haiti, 2018). The drastic
turnaround for the Dominican Republic’s tourism sector can be attributed to strong political
support for tourism development by the Dominican government (Fuller, 1999; World Bank,
2011).
1.3 The Gap in the Literature that this Paper Resolves
During my preliminary research on the determinants of tourism demand for this study, I
discovered a gap in how the main drivers of tourism demand are operationalized. Much of the
tourism determinants literature focuses on identifying the main individual drivers of tourism
demand. However, discussions on whether and how those drivers are connected or how they can
be managed to produce tourism demand are insufficient. The literature identifies political
stability (treated as evidence of tourism safety and security), infrastructure quality, destination
attractiveness and marketing promotions (or nation branding) among a list of significant
individual drivers of tourism demand for developing countries. Yet, a scholarly focus on
individual drivers is inadequate because it does not provide a complete explanation for how
tourists are often sensitive to a combination of factors which influence their travel behavior. If a
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country is politically stable, for example, but it lacks quality infrastructure and marketing
promotions about the country is low, it is unlikely that country will see a rise in travel arrivals.
Tourism demand is essentially subject to potential travelers’ preferences based on their
perception of a countries’ overall reputation as a travel destination. And, several factors work to
create a country’s image which, over time, produces its reputation to the potential travelers and
investors. Therefore, a scholarly discussion on how a country’s image is perceived, based on
those significant tourism drivers, is very important because a potential tourist’s perception of a
country is what ultimately influences travel behavior. Despite this, there is a lack of research on
how the most significant drivers identified in the literature, beyond political stability, contribute
to a country’s image to impact a traveler’s perception of the destination. In addition to safety
concerns, infrastructure quality and marketing promotions are important drivers that influence
country image. Moreover, the tourism driver literature also does not adequately explain the role
of governments have in managing tourism drivers to influence how their country is perceived by
potential tourists. In addition, the exclusive focus on political stability in the literature as the
primary indication of security in a country is insufficient. As a measure for safety and security,
in addition to political stability, I focus on crime rates in each test country. Finally, as one of the
test countries, Haiti, has a unique demographic of tourists, I expand on how tourism demand is
traditionally measured to sufficiently assess the overall level of tourism arrivals and receipts for
each test country. The purpose of my study is to examine government effectiveness in creating a
positive country image perception that produces an increase in tourism arrivals and receipts.
1.4 My Argument
I evaluate the political and social, pull or “attractive”, and tourism competitive factors
that significantly impact tourism arrivals in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Many potential
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causes may exist to explain why the Dominican Republic has fared better in its tourism sector
compared to Haiti. To narrow down the endogenous contributing factors, it is important to
determine the strategic actions (or, rather, inactions) taken by the key stakeholder in each
country, namely the government, in establishing, advancing and sustaining tourism within its
borders. I contend that governments, through state institutions and policies, can implement
strategies to impact and change existing country image perceptions to generate an increase in
tourism arrivals and receipts (tourism arrivals and receipts are an expansion of the common
measurement for tourism demand that will be explained in my theory section). The strategies are
based upon government institutions: 1) ensuring that tourists enjoy a politically stable and crime
safe environment through the implementation of public safety measures (a political factor); 2)
investing in the construction of quality infrastructure (a pull factor) using public and private
sector capital investments; and 3) engage in tourism marketing through nation branding policies
and partnerships with the private sector (a tourism competitive factor).
I hypothesize that successful management of these three factors by effective government
institutions are essential to create a positive country image which increases tourism arrivals and
receipts. This thesis will evaluate how effective government institutions were in controlling
these factors in three comparative studies: 1) a separate historical individual country analysis
comparing Haiti’s past and current tourism sector; 2) a historical individual country analysis
comparing Dominican Republic’s past and current tourism arrivals and receipts; and, 3) a
comparison between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
1.5 Tourism Demand Determinants Literature
The literature on tourism demand has established that tourism demand is influenced by
numerous factors. The most comprehensive study, on which variables most impact tourism
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demand in developing countries, provides a panel data analysis of Latin American and Caribbean
countries and establishes three main classifications for the determinants (Pivčević et all, 2016):
1) pull (or attractive) factors—based on the characteristics of the inbound travel destination
which includes destination promotional programs, destination attractiveness, social and cultural
ties, climate, events; 2) political and social factors —which includes political stability within the
inbound travel destination as important for security as the study establishes that the higher the
political stability, the higher the tourism demand (Eugenio-Martin, Morales and Scarpa, 2004 as
mentioned in Pivčević et all, 2016); and 3) pull-tourism competitiveness factor—an inbound
country determinant of tourism demand that includes nation branding/marketing promotions.
The determinants, from the three classifications, with the most positive, statistically
significant and correlated relationship with tourism demand are reflected in Table 1.1 below.
The current literature provides a foundation for further expansion that the theoretical framework
of this paper is based upon.
Table 1.1 Most Significant Determinants of Tourism Demand (Dependent Variable)
Identified in Literature
Causes/Influences
Political and Social
Factors
Pull Factors
Tourism
Competitiveness Factors

Tourism Demand
Determinants
 Political Stability/Security

Independent Variables in the
Literature
 Political Stability

 Destination Attractiveness
 Infrastructure
 Marketing Promotions

 Tourism Infrastructure
Expenditure
 Nation Branding

1.1.1 Political Stability as a Security Determinant
One of the major considerations for a potential traveler seeking to visit any foreign
destination is the country’s political stability and internal security environment. In tourism
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demand literature, the predominant focus has been the destination’s level of political stability.
Generally, any evidence of unrest within a country will likely deter visitors from deciding to
travel to that destination. Hall (1994), determined that political stability is a “fundamental
precondition” (Hall, 1994) to establishing a successful tourism sector. Baker (2012) contends
that “modern mass tourists tend to long for relaxing, safe, and unconcerned vacations when they
travel.’’ (Baker, 2012: 91)
Studies centered on the impact of political stability on tourism demand have varied in
focus, methodology and scope. Many authors have differed on the parameters for measuring
political stability or rather its inverse, namely, political instability as well as the testing variable
for tourism. One branch of scholarship discusses political instability and its potential impact on
traveler behavior in certain countries. However, that stream of literature also heavily examines
the effect of terrorism on tourism development. Researchers, under this stream, diverge on
whether to treat terrorism as a measure of political instability or as a phenomenon that is either
incidental to or creates instability. This debate often distracts researchers from developing
studies on the types of security challenges that may influence tourism demand beyond political
stability. Despite these deviations, all scholars agree that political stability is vital for tourism;
and, by contrast, political instability within a country produces a negative effect on both tourism
demand and overall tourism development.
Regarding the first stream of scholarship on the impact of political instability on tourism
demand, many researchers believe that terrorism is significant to the overall study of political
instability’s influence on tourism development (Alvarez & Campo, 2014; Coshall, 2003;
Maditinos & Vassiliadi, 2008; Nassar, 2012; Neumayer, 2004; Sonmez, 1998; Yap & Saha,
2013). Contrarily, others debate that terrorism is often an exclusive phenomenon that only
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certain countries experience. Furthermore, terrorism is not only separate from political
instability, but driven because of it (Campos, 2009). However, proponents of including terrorism
as a form of political instability assert that the study of them are important or relevant to tourism
because researchers have identified that terrorists often, specifically, target tourists to advance
their terroristic goals (Sonmez, 1998; Neumayer, 2004). Reports of politically motivated attacks
on tourists legitimizes the security concern that potential travelers have as they make travel
decisions. However, beyond terrorism, the literature has not provided further evidence that
travelers have been targeted in destinations where other forms of political instability are
prevalent.
Out of the first branch of scholarship, a second stream of literature emerged to provide
explanations for why political instability adversely affects tourism demand. Political instability
often generates negative publicity; and, because of deleterious travel reports, tourism demand
decreases (Thapa, 2003). The decline in tourism arrivals comes from the fact that political
instability, along with civil unrest and war, often creates the perception of a safety risk for
travelers (Lepp, 2003). Therefore, the perceptions of political instability and safety become the
prerequisite for tourists to travel (Hall and O’Sullivan, 1996). The second branch of literature
concerns itself with the measurement of increase or decrease in tourism travel based on a
country’s temporary or long-term instability. Depending on a travel consumer’s perception of
the country’s risk for travel, research findings are that the perception of high travel risk not only
influences a travel consumer’s behavior, but the country’s overall image (Ryu, 2005).
Furthermore, the longer the period of instability, the more likely a travel consumer will
determine that a country is too unstable for travel (Yap & Sap, 2013). However, if the instability
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is incidental, stemming from an event or series of events, travel consumers will view the
instability as temporary.
In his literature review of the subject, Hall reiterates Richter and Waugh’s (1986)
contention that governmental leaders underestimate political peace as the primary and
fundamental precondition for tourism development (Nyaruwata, 2013). Ultimately, tourists
seriously consider safety and security problems when choosing travel destinations (Nyaruwata,
2013). Therefore, it is the government’s responsibility to create a politically stable environment
to attract and retain a thriving tourism industry for the purposes of economic development
(Nyaruwata, 2013). Causevic and Lynch (2013) point out that there is void in the research with
studies focused on how governments handle challenges with political instability within their
borders. Most specifically, literature is still lacking on regulations and laws which are created to
manage tourism development post-conflict or counteract the decline in tourism demand caused
by political instability (Causevic and Lynch, 2013).
1.1.2 Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure
Much of the tourism determinants literature focuses on infrastructure quality as a vehicle
to develop tourism and attract tourism demand. Few tourism driver studies specifically
investigated spending on infrastructure directly. Within the research on the tourism drivers, that
lead to successful tourism development, authors either incidentally mention which stakeholder is
most fiscally responsible for spending on infrastructure or they fail to adequately specify the
responsible party. The literature on this subject is important for two reasons: 1) establishing that
infrastructure is a prerequisite for maintaining a successful tourism sector; and 2) incidentally
linking the importance of spending on infrastructure to tourism demand.
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The study that comes close to discussing the stakeholders most responsible for
infrastructure spending is Giap et al’s study on Malaysia’s tourism sector. Giap et al (2016)
contends that government expenditures on tourism promotion and infrastructure, specific to the
enhancement of airport facilities, are the main determinants of tourism demand in Malaysia.
Similar studies on developing countries also identify infrastructure quality as either an important
factor or the most vital determinant of tourism demand (Khadaroo-Seetanah, 2007; Dwyer &
Spurr, 2011; Assaf & Josiassen, 2011; Seetanah et al, 2011; Giap et al, 2016 and Jovanovic & Illic
(2017)). However, despite their shared contention that having a quality infrastructure impacts

tourism demand, the authors differ on which type of infrastructure is most relevant for tourism.
Furthermore, the tourism demand literature asserts that small island countries are particularly
impacted by the quality of their infrastructure especially as it applies to their airport conditions
(Giap et al, 2016). The argument was previously established by McElroy’s study on small island
tourism development where the author found it difficult to classify the least traveled islands
(McElroy, 2006). This was because the least traveled islands had the tendency to lack enough
government expenditures to sustain tourism due to their inadequate land infrastructure
development; and, as a result, those islands were not prime for mass tourism or significant
tourism demand (McElroy, 2006).
Across the literature, authors diverge on their conceptualization of tourism infrastructure.
Some authors classified the infrastructure that impacted tourism demand in limited terms of land
or road networks (McElroy, 2006). While other researchers focused their studies on the impact
that transport infrastructure (in terms of transport services) had on tourism demand (Prideaux,
2000; Khadaroo & Seetanah, 2007; Seetanah et al, 2011). Prideaux (2000) referred to transport
infrastructure as public infrastructure, which includes a country’s transport system. He further
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defines the transport system as it applies to tourism as ‘‘the operation of, and interaction
between, transport modes, ways and terminals that support tourists into and out of destinations
and also the provision of transport services within the destination.’’ (Prideaux, 2000). He argued
if tourists were hindered to travel to their chosen destinations by inefficiencies in the country’s
public infrastructure, the likeliness of them choosing alternate destinations increases. This is
because transport inadequacies create a lengthy and uncomfortable travel within a tourist’s travel
destination as well as drives the cost of travel to uncompetitive prices (Prideaux, 2000; Seetanah
et al, 2011). Based on a country’s transportation systems need for efficiency, Prideaux (2000)
further argues that transportation infrastructure is a precondition of a successful tourism sector.
However, Prideaux does not address the country’s government’s role in financing or arranging
private sector capital to fund its transportation infrastructure.
In their journal article “Does Infrastructure Matter in Tourism Development” centered on
the island of Mauritius, Seetanah et al (2011) mention that many different forms of infrastructure
(road, communication, waste and energy) collectively serve as fundamental parts of a country’s
tourism industry. The researchers suggest that the various types of infrastructure jointly comprise
the basis for a country’s “tourism infrastructure” (Seetanah et al, 2011); and tourism
infrastructure, is one of the leading drivers of tourism. Seetanah et al (2011) extend the
measurement of the tourism infrastructure model to include the number of hotel rooms available
within Mauritius. The authors reiterate that government expenditure on tourism infrastructure,
among other tourism related spending such as tourism promotion, is highly significant for
generating tourism demand. Moreover, in their extension of the tourism infrastructure model,
they find that hotel capacity is statistically significant for travelers who seek to stay at hotels;
but, it is not significant for tourists who prefer lower cost options (Seetanah et al, 2011).
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Assaf and Jossiassen (2012) confirmed that a country’s tourism and related infrastructure
base of quality roads, railroads, ports and airports was the most important determinant of tourism
demand. This is because a tourist’s ease of movement is impacted by the quality of a nations’
infrastructure (Prideaux, 2000; Assaf and Jossiassen, 2012). The authors attempt to combine the
road and land infrastructure with transportation infrastructure to create a more comprehensive
definition of tourism infrastructure. The study is significant in that it also established that
government expenditure was a highly ranked determinant that positively impacted tourism
performance. Moreover, the small island, Jamaica, which has a similar political, economic and
social system with the test countries of this thesis was included as a test country within Assaf and
Jossiassen’s study. It was one of the nations showing a positive performance measurement
against government expenditures and infrastructure.
Research conducted by Giap et al (2016) on tourism demand determinants in the
developing country, Malaysia, produced statistically significant results that government
expenditure on tourism promotion along with infrastructure investments in airport facilities
created tourism sector growth. The study provides insight on three key factors relevant to this
thesis: 1) it confirms that government expenditure is an important aspect of tourism demand and
2) reiterates the value of infrastructure as a tourism driver; and 3) by finding government
expenditure on tourism promotion a causal factor of tourism sector growth in a developing test
country, it establishes a link between government spending and a factor of nation branding (i.e.
tourism promotion). The areas for further study based on gaps in Giap et al’s (2016) research
include: 1) extending the conceptualization of tourism infrastructure to a more comprehensive
categorization; and 2) assessing the impact of government expenditure on a newly
conceptualized tourism infrastructure on tourism demand.
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Li et al (2013) conducted a study on tourism development in Malaysia, using a triangular
causal relationship model and inverted tests, and found that government capital investment in
infrastructure and other tourism drivers leads to an increase in tourism receipts. The researchers
then determined that, because of the increase in tourism receipts, economic growth within the
country was achieved (Li et al, 2013). An important study that included Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, along with other developing countries with similar political and socioeconomic
backgrounds, measured the direct relationship between economic tourism and growth from 1985
to 1998 (Eugenio-Martin et al, 2004). Significant to this thesis, it was discovered that tourism
increases if three key factors are established: infrastructures, education and safety. The
implications from the Eugenio-Martin et al (2004) study are that capital investment in
infrastructure and safety, factors which are essential for attracting tourist investors and tourists,
will lead to an increase in tourism development.
1.1.3 Nation Branding as a Marketing Determinant
Nation branding is still developing as a concept in political science scholarship. An
ongoing debate persists within the literature concerning nation branding. There is a
misperception about nation branding solely being a marketing tool versus a concentrated strategy
which governments can actively implement with the help of tourism promotional agencies.
Challenges exist on how measure or conceptualize nation branding, as governments often
confuse it with public relations; and, as a result, nations often employ promotional advertising
campaigns instead of improving the structural problems within their country that contribute to
their brand image. Despite the scholarly dispute, the consensus of authors, across all disciplines,
is that nation branding a determinate of tourism demand.
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Simon Anholt first coined "nation brand" term in 1996 (Anholt, 1996). The term referred
to the genuine reputation of states; and, thereby, nation branding included the cities, regions and
municipalities that behave similarly to brand images of corporations and products (Anholt,
2011). Anholt posited that those images are pivotal to advance, prosper and properly manage
nations (Anholt, 1996; Anholt, 2011). To understand the dynamics of how to best brand a
country, several researchers from various disciplines have adopted broad interpretations and
variations of the nation brand designation. Because of extensions of the nation brand definition
in the literature, there is a noted debate among scholars concerning the use of the nascent term
“nation branding” (Anholt, 2011, Kaneva, 2011). Further, Anholt believes that the growing use
of the term “nation branding” is misleading to his original theory on nation brands (Anholt,
2011); and governments, in collusion with branding consultants, mistakenly believe they can
manipulate their country image using commercial advertising to promote a better reputation than
they possess. The controversy over the practical use of nation branding in literature has created a
lag in the discipline which needs to be remedied. Nation branding studies are pivotal for tourism
development research to explain how to measure the impact of a country’s reputation on tourism
arrivals and tourism investment. It is also valuable to understand how governments can develop
a strong brand image despite having experienced political, social and economic widely known
difficulties within their country’s borders.
The most comprehensive literature review on nation branding and state image comes
from researcher Nadia Kaneva (Kaneva, 2011). In recognition of the discourse between scholars
on the use of the terms nation brand versus nation branding, and to advance research on the
subject matter, Kaneva argues that critical studies have a minority perspective in the ongoing
debates about the nation branding concept (2011). To resolve this, the author reviewed 186
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research studies across various disciplines, from 1997 to 2009, to clarify the actual significance
of the numerous perspectives on nation brand research. Recognizing the widely accepted term
“nation-branding” as the act of branding a nation (Kaneva, 2011), Kaneva identifies that there
are three categories of literature, namely, technical-economic, political and cultural. Most
relevant for the development of this thesis, are the studies classified as 1) technical-economicwhich are concerned with economic growth, efficiency, and capital accumulation and include
many tourism studies; and 2) political-which are mainly centered on the influence of country
images on states’ participation in a global system in the area of international relations (Kaneva,
2011).
In today’s globalized world, nations and brand image integrate in the minds of potential
customers and investors creating a “country of origin” effect (Van Ham, 2009). The country of
origin effect is where a nation’s reputation influences consumer purchasing power or foreign
direct investment (Van Ham, 2001; 2009). A state’s good reputation and image is part of its
“strategic equity” (Van Ham, 2001) where a country, much like a company’s products, relies
heavily on consumer and investor confidence based on their interpretation of that brand’s quality.
Szondi, 2008, defined nation branding as the strategic self-preserving means in which countries
created “reputational capital through economic, promotion and social interest promotion at home
and abroad” (Szondi, 2008: 5). The main benefit of nation branding is to strengthen the
country’s brand (Anholt, 2009), as well as improve the national image through promotional
efforts. Morgan and Pitchard (2000) explained the importance of branding countries by stating
that the competition for travelers in tourism is not achieved through brand value; instead,
effective nation branding influences what is perceived and felt by travelers about the destination.
Tourism branding and promotion cannot be conducted without considering the country’s image.
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Therefore, tourism promotion is only successful if countries first develop a successful national
brand (Cromwell, 2016).
2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Several possible factors impact tourism demand. Therefore, predicting the specific
elements that produces demand is complex. Despite the various possible variables that exist as
determinants, certain significant tourism drivers can be further developed to help predict the
likelihood that governments of developing countries can implement strategies that impact
country image perceptions to attract more visitors and travel receipts. I argue that it is
probabilistic that tourism arrivals and receipts, the dependent variable of this paper, is generated
when travelers perceive a country’s image as positive and viable for travel based on a
combination of three independent variables derived from the main drivers of tourism demand:
public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding, a country’s ability to develop a
strong brand that it can successfully market and promote to its target market of potential
travelers. The premise for my theory is that governments, through state institutions and policies,
can implement strategies that impact and change existing country image perceptions. This is
accomplished when government institutions work together to create a favorable country brand by
investing in the development of functional benefits {public safety and infrastructure quality, as
foundation for destination’s appeal} that is supplied to the potential travelers who demand them
in order to visit, lodge and spend money in the country.
My theoretical framework is based upon an expansion of the most statistically significant
tourism demand determinants identified in the literature namely, political stability and security,
infrastructure quality and nation branding as the vehicle for marketing promotions. In this
paper, I develop more precise measurements for these variables as well as expand on the
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operationalization of tourism demand in the form of “tourism arrivals and receipts” which serves
as the dependent variable of this study. Table 2.1 outlines the expansion of the most significant
determinants of tourism demand that was used as the basis for this paper’s independent variables.
Table 2.1 Theoretical Expansion of the Determinants of Tourism Demand Literature
Causes/Influences

Tourism Demand Literature
Independent Variables
▪ Political Stability

Thesis Independent Variables

Pull Factors

▪

Tourism Infrastructure
Expenditure
o Destination
Attractiveness
o Infrastructure

▪

Tourism
Competitiveness
Factors

▪

Nation Branding
o Marketing Promotions

▪

Political and Social
Factors

2.1

▪

Public Safety
o Crime rates
o Political stability
Infrastructure Investment
o Government spending on
infrastructure
o Private sector investment in
infrastructure
Nation Branding
o Public tourism promotion
investment
o Public Private Tourism
Promotion Partnerships

Public Safety Theory
Safety and security are prerequisites for successful tourism development, as tourists

desire to travel to destinations that are safe and where security is assured (Mansfield and Pizam,
2006). If travelers believe a destination is unsafe, it will cause them to develop a negative
impression of that destination, thereby causing tourism demand to decline (George, 2010;
Ghaderi et al, 2017). The literature on tourism demand has established that political stability is a
positive determinant of tourism demand. Scholarship has also determined that the converse
relationship exists when instances of political instability threaten safety and security at tourist
destinations. The focus on political stability as a measure of security is well founded. However,
the measurement of security must be expanded include the examination of other potential
security threats that may serve as deterrents to travel. There are four potential instigators of
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security threats that may cause tourists to avoid a travel destination: 1) crime-related incidents; 2)
terrorism; 3) war; 4) and civil/political unrest (Pizam, 2006). Terrorism, war and civil/political
unrest and other violent occurrences are often linked and classified under political instability by
researchers. Crime-related incidents are important, but not collectively included or considered in
terms of its relationship to tourism demand as politically stability (Ghaderi et al, 2017).
However, crime-related incidents or the perception that a destination has a high level of crime
could potentially render a destination as unsafe.
Findings on crime rates and tourism indicate that theft is often the widely reported crime
against tourists (Glensor and Peak, 2004). However, in the event tourists do not report crimes
against them, crime rate levels will indicate the overall safety of the travel destination. Crimes
against tourists typically occur in areas that experience higher overall crime rates. Travelers are
at risk to other crimes in addition to thefts such as assaults, homicides, robberies, scams and
credit card fraud. Furthermore, the assessment of crime rate levels indicates the effectiveness of
the government providing tourism security (Glensor and Peak, 2004). To address the gap in the
literature that singularly addresses the impact of political stability on tourism demand and the
lack of studies on the level of crime rates and tourism demand, I develop the public safety
variable that includes the measurement of crime rates as well as political stability.
2.2

Infrastructure Investment Theory
Previous literature has measured investment in public infrastructure through

infrastructure rankings that assess the quality of a nation’s infrastructure. Undoubtedly, a quality
and modern infrastructure is an important driver of tourism development (Sakai, 2007; Jovanovic
and Ilic, 2016) because infrastructure facilitates the commerce of tourism (Sakai, 2007).
Infrastructure makes the private distribution of tourism services more efficient as all forms of
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transportation infrastructure (road, air and sea) are important for travel to and within a
destination - especially for countries with remote attractions to offer. Moreover, overnight
tourists serve as temporary residents of a destination; therefore, the demand for physical
infrastructure such as water, sewer, electricity and communication is also important for
investment. Public infrastructure is a fundamental function of the government (Hodge and
Greve, 2017), who will allocate public capital on infrastructure if tourism is intended to be a vital
part of the country’s economy (2017).
The level of public expenditures the government allocates is directly correlated with its
intention to actively develop its infrastructure (Sakai, 2007; Jovanovic and Ilic, 2016). In
addition to public investment in infrastructure, it is important that the private sector is given
incentives to invest in infrastructure. While the state is directly responsible for transportation
and environmental infrastructure, social tourism infrastructure (rooms to accommodate tourists
and other supportive physical structures that facilitate activities and services to attract tourists
such as hotels, stadiums, convention centers and galleries) (Jovanavic and Ilic, 2016). Social
infrastructure, as part of the overall tourism infrastructure framework, requires extensive
investment from the private sector (Jovanavic and Ilic, 2016). Vives, Benavides, and Paris
(2010, p. 412) contend that nearly all public infrastructure endeavors will need the participation
of the public and private sectors; therefore, infrastructure projects are generally public-private
partnerships. To effectively assess the government’s role in building and improving
infrastructure, I will use government’s spending on infrastructure and private sector investment
(including public-private partnerships in infrastructure) as the measurements for the
infrastructure investment variable.
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2.3

Nation Branding Theory
Nation branding has been a challenge for scholars to define and measure. The dispute on

the conceptualization and operationalization has led to the creation of a country brand index
which is more of a measurement of country image quality than it is on effective branding efforts.
This paper bypasses the debate on how branding is operationalized to provide a simpler
measurement for tourism promotions. The goal of nation branding is for countries to selfevaluate, conduct a situation analysis of the country’s strengths and weaknesses, and recognize
what needs to be achieved to make the country more attractive as a destination (Nawaz &
Hassan, 2016). For countries, this involves investing heavily in the factors that drive tourism,
developing policies to encourage tourism and then promoting the country brand through
marketing initiatives.
I will focus on how much public and private investment has been allocated to marketing
promotions as the measurement for nation branding, including favorable policies that encourage
tourism development. The public sector is responsible for building a country brand image and
the promotion of its tourism sector outside of the country (Nawaz & Hassan, 2016). The level of
capital investment from the public and private sectors signifies the priority governments place on
building a positive image of their country. At the beginning of tourism development,
government authorities from the national and regional level take a primary leadership role
promoting tourism. To that end, the government is the pioneer in all facets of tourism
development including marketing endeavors (Nawaz & Hassan, 2016). However, as tourism
successfully develops through later stages, effective nation branding causes the public sector to
partner with the private sector in its nation branding efforts (Göymen, 2000; Mckercher &
Ritchie, 1997; Nawaz & Hassan, 2016). The evidence of public sector expenditures on tourism
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marketing and public-private sector partnerships to promote tourism will serve as the variables
that comprise nation branding in this paper.
2.4

Country Image Perception (Intervening Variable)
Country image perception is discussed in numerous scholarly reports on tourism

development. This is because the perception of a country can contribute to its overall reputation
over time in the mass tourism market based on the continual information potential travelers
receive. The perception of a country’s image ultimately influences travelers’ decision to visit
that destination. For travelers, a strong positive country brand image projecting a destination’s
appeal will likely create a higher demand for travel to that destination over other possible
destinations with weaker and negative brand images (Ezeudiji et al, 2016).
Country image perception is often caused by the image projected to and developed
emotionally by travelers (Lopes, 2011; Rajesh, 2013; Ezeudiji et al, 2016). The traveler’s
perception derives from direct travel experiences (Lopes, 2011; Ezeudiji et al, 2016) or from
external information sources about a destination (Tasci & Gartner, 2007; Ezeudiji et al, 2016)
that is then conveyed to the public. The destination travel information may take the form of a
traveler’s country travel warning reports, mass media reports or by public comments made
available to them from seemingly credible sources such as, for example, United States’ president
Donald Trump’s “shithole” comment about Haiti. The information received about a destination,
which affect tourist perceptions, are exogenous to the inbound travel destination; and, therefore,
they are beyond the destination’s control. However, there are internal country image
management strategies, in the form of nation branding, that destinations can implement to
influence how their country is perceived.
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Country image perception originates from tourism demand based on a traveler’s desire
for destination attractiveness. Therefore, for a tourist destination, its supply (or its country’s
brand essence) must project a positive country image to satisfy tourism demand. Crouch (2011)
stated that it is up to the country to supply destination attractiveness, which is comprised of
important elements: “the reality of the destination’s attributes and qualities (destination’s
appeal), and how this reality is communicated to and perceived by tourists (destination’s
knowledge and understanding), in comparison to the other information received about other
destinations” (Crouch, 2011; as discussed in Ezeuduji et al, 2016). The country’s brand essence
provides the “functional and emotional benefits of a brand” (de Chernatony & Harris, 2010 as
discussed in Ezeuduji et al, 2016) as well as establishes the country’s competitive advantage over
its potential competitors in the mass tourism market. As the costs associated with travel are large
and infrequent, potential travelers will likely choose a destination with a positive image over one
that is unfavorable; and, they will favor the destination that can offer the functional and
emotional benefits demanded for traveling outside of their usual habitat (Ezeudiji et al, 2016).
While the emotional benefits (i.e. visiting family, attending business events, sight-seeing and
visiting attractions) (Ezeuduji et al, 2016) are acknowledged, the focus of this paper will be on
the functional advantages that the destination can supply to meet a tourist’s demand. The
functional benefits are tangible in nature, serve as the basis for a destination’s appeal and
positive country image; and those benefits are comprised of a country’s physical characteristics
such as tourism security, quality infrastructure and facilities (Pawitra & Tan, 2003; Vengesayi,
2003; Ezeudiji et al, 2016). Ultimately, to match tourism demand and exceed traveler’s
destination costs, destinations need to provide a balance of functional and emotional advantages
by producing a positive country brand.
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2.5

Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (Dependent Variable) Theory
Tourism demand is often measured in the literature by “international arrivals” per year

indicating overnight stays or “international visitors per year” that includes all visitor types (i.e.
cruise arrivals) if overnight arrival data is unavailable. For the purposes of this paper, I will
expand on most of the literature’s operationalization of tourism demand and create a new
dependent variable called “tourism arrivals and receipts”. Tourism arrivals and receipts will
consist of two components: 1) the international arrivals per year and b) international receipts per
year. Considering the case studies of this thesis will conduct analysis over a time series, over
which one of the test countries departed the mass tourism market to evolve into a niche tourism
market (which includes an extensive cruise tourism sector), it is important to evaluate the actual
growth rates of tourism over time.
Figure 2.1 below provides a visual overview of the theoretical framework of this paper
and how the independent variables interact with country image perception to generate increases
in tourism arrivals and receipts.

Figure 2-1 Theoretical Model- How the Independent Variables Interact with the
Intervening Variable to Increase Tourism Arrivals and Receipts
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2.6

Independent Variables

2.6.1 Public Safety (IV1)
a.

Conceptual definition: State security measures taken to protect people against safety
and security risks such as crime and unintended consequences of an involuntary nature
such as political instability1. Two variables make up public safety, the main independent
variable of this paper; and they are namely, crime rates and political stability.
1. Crime rates— Crime rate is the total crimes complied to “assess the effectiveness
of a crime control policy, and the impact of the policy on the risk of crime
victimization”2.
2. Political stability— Following Hurwitz, political stability is: “(1) the absence of
violence; governmental longevity/duration; (3) the existence of a legitimate
constitutional (4) the absence of structural change; and (5) a multifaceted societal”3

b.

Operationalization: Public Safety (IV1) will be measured using several data sources
for the 1940-2017 period that covers the entire tourism cycles for the Dominican
Republic and Haiti.
Crime rates—I will measure crime rates for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, from
1940 -1999 using information gathered from: 1) Country Study on the Dominican
Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the Library of
Congress (Library of Congress, 2001) which contains a discussion of major crime
incidents (such as homicides, assaults, thefts and robberies, drug trafficking related

1
Public safety definition—is my conceptual definition based on a combination of definitions from the tourism determinants literature
defining safety and security. My conceptual definition is derived from this link:
https://erl.ucc.edu.gh/jspui/bitstream/123456789/3157/1/GETRUDE%20POKU.pdf
2
Crime rate definition—https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/crime-rate/
3
Political stability definition— Hurwitz, L. (1973). Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability. Comparative Politics, 5(3), 449463. doi:10.2307/421273
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crime and rape). From 1995-2010, for the Dominican Republic, I will use the
indicators from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The
UNODC measure is the number of intentional homicides (which is generally used in
the literature on crime to measure crime rate level in many countries); and, intentional
homicide is defined as unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another
person. From 2011-2017, I will use the number of intentional homicides data available
in the Overseas Security Advisory Center (OSAC) Reports on Dominican Republic.
For Haiti, from 1999-2016, I will use the UNODC data on intentional homicides
(available from 1999-2012) and use the U.N. MINUSTAH Audit Reports (for the 20132017 period) that reported data on intentional homicides.
For 1940-2017, much of the public safety (IV1) data on crime rates and political
stability for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, is unavailable or sporadic. For both
countries, published statistics for both indexes were instituted in the mid-1990’s.
Furthermore, numerous international organizations assert that crime rates in the
Dominican Republic and Haiti have been underreported (Library of Congress, 2001;
OSAC, 2007-2018; MINUSTAH, 2012). As a result, I am using the more readily
available international homicide rates to indicate crime levels where statistics on other
types of crime which affect tourists (robberies and thefts, assaults, kidnappings, and
rape) are widely unavailable for the time discussed in this paper. Due to the unreliable
or missing data for the public safety (IV1), I have developed the following subjective
judgment operationalization:
IV1(A) Public safety/crime rates –To distinguish between low and high crime rate
levels, I will implement a scale of low, moderate, high and critical.
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For crime rates preceding the time where actual numbers were reported (1940-1994), I
will use the information discussed in the Library of Congress Report on the level of
crime in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (2001) to assign the level of crime rate. For
crime rate data that was reported in numbers during 1995-2017, the crime rate category
will be based on the number of international homicides reported. The higher the
number of international homicides reported, the more unsafe the country. The
Overseas Security Advisory Center (OSAC https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=22180) provides a
description for each level of crime rate:
“Low”—indicates that there is low threat of crime and for reported international
homicide numbers of 0-500; “Moderate”—indicates that the threat of crime is
moderate, and there is some crime but it is less likely to occur and for reported
international homicide rates of 501-1,000; “High”—indicates that the threat of crime is
high, common and there is a likely chance of occurrence and for international homicide
rates of 1001-2000; and “Critical” – the highest level – indicates that the threat of
crime is very common, very high, imminent and very likely to occur, and for
international homicide rates of 2001-above. The lower the level of crime rate, the
higher the public safety level
Political stability—I will measure political stability for the Dominican Republic and
Haiti, from 1940 -1999 using information gathered from: 1) Country Study on the
Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the
Library of Congress (Library of Congress, 2001) which contains information on the
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periods of political stability/instability for each country4. For 1996-2017, I will
measure political stability using the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) project that reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200
countries and territories over the period 1996–2016, for six dimensions of governance
solely focusing on the political stability and absence of violence statistics as the
measure for political stability 5. The WGI percentile rank indicators for political
stability and absence of violence/terrorism “measures perceptions of the likelihood of
political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism”
(http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=1181&series=PV.PER.RNK).
Percentile rank indicates the rank of a country among all countries that are covered by
the indicator. “0” corresponds to the lowest rank and “100” to the highest rank.
Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the public safety (IV1) prior to 1995, I
have developed the following subjective judgment operationalization:
IV1(B) Public safety/political stability— To distinguish between the lowest percentile
rank and highest percentile rank of political stability in each test country, I will
implement a scale of stable, moderate, and unstable. Expanding on the WGI’s
percentile rank measurement definition, a percentile rank of “0-49” corresponds to
unstable (active incidents of violence, political unrest and political instability); a
percentile rank of “50-89” corresponds to moderately stable (no major incidents, there
may be some random political unrest or temporary instability incidents); and a
percentile rank of “90-100” corresponds to stable (no threat of major incidents, political

4
Political stability measurement (1940-1995):
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_1.pdf and
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_4.pdf?ver=2012-10-11163239-190
5
Political stability measurement (1996-present): http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home
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unrest, violence and political instability is unlikely). For political stability information
during the period, 1940-1994, I will assign the level of stability from the information
reported in the Library of Congress Report on Haiti and the Dominican Republic
(2001). For political stability that was reported in country rank figures by the WGI
from 1995-2016, the closer the percentile rank of the country is to 100, the more stable
the country. The more politically stable the country, the higher the public safety level
Public Safety (IV1) Hypothesis - The lower the level of crime rates and the more
political stable the country, the higher the public safety which produces a positive
country image perception that attracts more tourism arrivals and receipts
2.6.2 Infrastructure Investment (IV2)
a. Conceptual definition: the public and private spending on all the facilities used to deliver
energy, water, sanitation, telecommunication and transport (land, air, and sea)6. Two
variables make up infrastructure investment, a main independent variable of this paper; and
they are namely, public spending on infrastructure and private sector investment in
infrastructure.
1. Public spending on infrastructure— state, regional and local spending on
infrastructure services. Infrastructure is defined to cover six sectors: irrigation,
energy (primarily power), transport, communication, wastewater management,
and water supply7
2. Private sector investment in infrastructure— capital investments in infrastructure
in the form of a) full privatization or stand alone in infrastructure developments

6
Infrastructure investment definition: The conceptual definition comes from a World Bank report on infrastructure (2006) at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDECABCTOK2006/Resources/Antonio_Estache_Infrastructure_for_Growth.pdf
7
Public spending on infrastructure: The conceptual definition comes from the Public Spending on Infrastructure guide available at the
World Bank website: https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-5905
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or projects; or b) public-private partnerships (PPPs), which are partnerships
between public sector organizations and private sector investors and business for
the purpose of designing, planning, financing, constructing, providing and/or
operating infrastructure, facilities or related services8
b. Operationalization: Infrastructure investment (IV2) will be measured using several
data sources for the 1940-2017-time period that covers the entire tourism cycles for the
Dominican Republic and Haiti.
Public spending on infrastructure—I will measure public spending on infrastructure in
the Dominican Republic, from 1940 - 2016 using information provided on government
spending on infrastructure (energy, water, sanitation, telecommunication and transport
(land, air, and sea)), gathered from the following sources: 1) 2001 Country Study on the
Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the Library
of Congress (for the time period 1940-2001); 2) IMF Working Paper, 2007 (for the time
period 2002-2006)9 and 3) Tourism Development in the Dominican Republic article
(Duffy et al, 2016) (for the time period 2007-2016). For Haiti, I will measure public
spending in infrastructure using the following sources: 1) 2001 Country Study on the
Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the Library
of Congress (for the period 1940-2001); and 2) CFI Invest in Haiti statistics (for the
period 2014-2018).

8
Private sector investment in infrastructure definition: The conceptual definition for private sector investment in infrastructure comes
from the World Economic Forum Infrastructure Investment Participation Blueprint (Wyman, 2014); and Public Private Partnerships
(PPP) definition: The conceptual definition for PPP comes from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation report:
http://www.cpppc.org/u/cms/ppp/201711/30162729estl.pdf
9
Public and PPP information: (D.R. 1940-2001): http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a242550.pdf; 9
and Country Studies on Dominican Republic, 1999: http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm:
http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm; (IMF Working Paper, Jaramillo and Sancak, 2007), 2007; 1990-2017:
https://pppknowledgelab.org/countries/dominican-republic
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Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the IV2(A) infrastructure
investment/public spending on infrastructure prior to 2018, I have developed the
following subjective judgment operationalization:
IV2(A) Infrastructure investment/public spending on infrastructure: –To distinguish
between low and high infrastructure investment levels, I will implement a scale of low,
moderate, and high. For the period 1940-2017 for the Dominican Republic and Haiti,
specific capital investment was not readily available for the entire period. However,
based on information provided by the reports on public spending mentioned above on
public infrastructure building and improvements, a classification can be made on the
level of infrastructure investment for this period. For capital investments in infrastructure
that was available, the categories covered under the scale for public spending on
infrastructure are as follows: a “low” level investment (in millions) corresponds to $0500; a “moderate” level investment corresponds to $501-1,000; and a “high” level
investment corresponds to $1,001-above. The higher the level of public spending on
infrastructure, the higher the infrastructure investment.
Private sector investment in infrastructure—I will measure private sector investment in
the Dominican Republic, from 1940 - 2017 using information provided on a) publicprivate partnerships for investment in energy, water, sanitation, telecommunication and
transport (land, air, and sea) infrastructure (PPI); and b) the number of hotel rooms,
representing tourism physical infrastructure, gathered from the following sources: 1)
2001 Country Study on the Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal
Research Division of the Library of Congress (for the time period 1940-2001); 2) IMF
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Working Paper, 2007 (for the time period 2002-2006)10 ; 3) The Seaside Resorts in the
Dominican Republic; A Typology journal article (Myer-Arendt, 1992); 4) Tourism in the
Dominican Republic Project Paper (Barrera et al, 2007); 5) Tourism Development in the
Dominican Republic: An examination of the impact on coastal households (Duffy et al,
2016); and 6) PPP capital investment data (in millions USD) from the PPP Knowledge
Lab: https://pppknowledgelab.org/ (for the time period 1990-2017). For Haiti, I will
measure private sector investment in infrastructure for the time period 1940 - 1990 using
information provided on a) public-private partnerships for investment in energy, water,
sanitation, telecommunication and transport (land, air, and sea) infrastructure; and b) the
number of hotel rooms, gathered from the following sources: 1) 2001 Country Study on
the Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the
Library of Congress; 2) The Haitian Dilemma journal article (Preeg, 1996); Reviving
Haiti’s Paradise journal article (Luxner, 1999); and 4) PPP capital investment data (in
millions USD) from the PPP Knowledge Lab: https://pppknowledgelab.org/ (for the time
period 1990-2017).
Due to the unreliable or missing data for IV2(B) Infrastructure Investment/ Private sector
investment in infrastructure, I have developed the following subjective judgment
operationalization:
IV2(B) Infrastructure Investment/Private sector investment in infrastructure— I will
implement a scale of low, moderate, and high to indicate a) the level of public-private
partnerships in infrastructure (PPI) and a scale of low, moderate, high and very high to

10

Public and PPP information: (D.R. 1940-2001): http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a242550.pdf; 10
and Country Studies on Dominican Republic, 1999: http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm:
http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm; Seaside Resort article (Meyer-Ardent et al, 1992); Tourism in D.R. Report
(Barrera et al, 2007); and Tourism Development article (Duffy et al, 2015); Jaramillo and Sancak, 2007; 1990-2017:
https://pppknowledgelab.org/countries/dominican-republic
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indicate b) the level of hotel rooms investment that funded infrastructure projects and
hotel developments between 1940-2017. For PPIs, the World Bank’s PPI Database
reports capital investment in infrastructure in millions (USD). Based on information
provided by the World Bank’s PPP Knowledge Lab, a “low” level investment (in
millions) corresponds to $0-500; a “moderate” level investment corresponds to $5011,000; and a “high” level investment corresponds to $1,001-above. The higher the level
of PPP investment in infrastructure, the higher the infrastructure investment. For the
level of hotel rooms investment, a “low” number of hotel rooms corresponds to 0-7,999;
a “moderate” level investment corresponds to 8,000-19,999; a “high” level investment
corresponds to 20,000-49,999; and a “very high” level investment corresponds to
“50,000-above”.
Infrastructure Investment (IV2) Hypothesis – The higher the level of public spending
and private sector investment in infrastructure, the higher the investment in infrastructure
which produces a positive country image perception that attracts tourism arrivals and
receipts
2.6.3 Nation Branding (IV3)
a. Conceptual definition: Defined as the coordinated government efforts to manage a
country’s image in order to promote tourism, investment and foreign relations11 (Volcic
& Andrejevic, 2011. Nation branding consists of two variables:
1. Public tourism promotion investment— National, regional and local government
expenditures spent to advance tourism promotional activities including tourism

11

Volcic, Z., & Andrejevic, M. (2011). Nation branding in the era of commercial nationalism. International Journal of
Communication, 5, 21.

34

promotion, marketing, visitor information services, administrative and other
public services related to tourism development12.
2. Public-private tourism promotion partnership— a partnership between the public
and private sector to develop, position and execute destination branding, tourism
promotion and marketing activities13
b.

Operationalization: The nation branding (IV3) will be measured using several data
sources for the 1940-2017-time period that covers the entire tourism cycles for the
Dominican Republic and Haiti.
Public tourism promotion investment—During the period 1940-1994, I will measure
public tourism promotion investment using a compilation of information on public
tourism marketing investment available from the following sources as follows: 1) for the
Dominican Republic, I will use a) Country Report on Haiti and the Dominican Republic,
2001 and Tourism Development in the Dominican Republic (Fuller, 1999) (for the time
period covering 1940-1980); b) (Fuller, 1999), The International Women’s Rights Action
Watch Report on the Dominican Republic, The Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds
Report (Henderson, 2011), The Tourism Cluster Report, 2012; Caribbean Resource and
Development Centre Report, 1988 (for the time period 1981-2011); and c) WEF Travel
and Tourism Report, 2012-2018; Ministry of Tourism Report (2010) (for the time period
2011-2017); and

12
Public tourism promotion investment definition: —the conceptual definition is based on the World Trade and Tourism Council’s
definition on government collective spending: https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/regions2017/world2017.pdf
13
Public-private tourism promotion partnership definition— is my conceptual definition based on the World Travel and Tourism
Council discussion on private sector’s marketing role in conjunction with the public sector
http://www.ontit.it/opencms/export/sites/default/ont/it/documenti/archivio/files/ONT_2003-08-13_00163.pdf
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2) for Haiti, I will use a) the Development Associates, Inc, Tourism Specialist Report,
1986, the World Bank Country Report on Haiti, 1987, and the Library of Congress
Country Report, 2001 (for the period 1940-1994).
For the Dominican Republic and Haiti, for the period 1995 – 2017, I will measure
public tourism promotion investment using the “government spending on travel and
tourism percentage” statistics from the World Bank’s World Trade and Tourism Council
data set14. The figures include a percentage of total tourism expenditures of local and
regional government individual spending on the indices used to assess nation branding
for tourism development such as tourism marketing, visitor information services,
administrative services and other public services associated with tourism promotion. The
World Economic Forum that produces the Travel and Tourism annual reports by country
indicate that the percentage is used to determine the level of priority that governments
give to travel and tourism promotion.
Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the IV3(A) nation branding/public
tourism promotion investment prior to 2017, I have developed the following subjective
judgment operationalization:
IV3(A) nation branding/public tourism promotion investment: To distinguish
between low and high public tourism promotion investment levels, I will implement a
scale of low, moderate, and high. For the period 1940-1994, for the Dominican Republic
and Haiti, public tourism promotion investment financial statistics were not readily
available for the entire period. However, based on information provided by the reports
on public tourism promotion investment mentioned above on government investment in

14

https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/govt.tat.spend?country=HTI&indicator=24661&countries=DOM&viz=line_chart&years
=1995,2027
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tourism promotion, a classification can be made on the level of tourism promotion
investment from the public sector for this time. For the period 1995-2018, I used the
“government spending on travel and tourism percentage” statistics from the World
Bank’s World Trade and Tourism Council to determine the percentage levels for the
nation branding/tourism promotion investment’s “low-moderate and high” scale in
conjunction with the World Trade Council’s methodology for investment level. A “low”
level was based on a percentage of 0-9% of total tourism expenditures on public tourism
promotion; a “moderate” level investment was based on a percentage of 10-19% of total
tourism expenditures on public tourism promotion; and a “high” level investment was
based on a percentage of 20%-up of total tourism expenditures on public tourism
promotion. The higher the level of public tourism promotion investment, the more
effective the nation branding.
Public-private tourism promotion partnership— During the period 1940-2017, I
will measure public-private tourism promotion investment using a compilation of
information on public-private tourism promotion partnerships available from the
following sources as follows: 1) for the Dominican Republic, I will use a) the UN Treaty
data on Dominican Republic, 1982; Tourism Development in the Dominican Republic
(Fuller, 1999); Ministry of Tourism Report (2010) and WEF Travel and Tourism Report,
2011-2018 (for the time period 1940-2017); b) ; 2) for Haiti, I will use the Development
Associates, Inc, Tourism Specialist Report, 1986, the World Bank Country Report on
Haiti, 1987, the Library of Congress Country Report, 2001, the IADB Haiti Country
Report-Developing the North Department, 2016 and WEF Travel and Tourism Report,
2013-2018 (for the period 1940-2017).
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Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the IV3(B) nation branding/public -private
tourism promotion partnerships from 1940-2017, I have developed the following
subjective judgment operationalization:
IV3(B) nation branding/public-private tourism promotion partnerships: I will implement
a scale of low, moderate, and high. For the period 1940-2011, for the Dominican
Republic and Haiti, public-private tourism promotion partnership spending data was not
available for the entire period. However, based on information provided by the reports
on public-private partnerships for tourism promotion, a classification can be made on the
level of tourism promotion investment for this time. The higher the level of investment
of public-private sector tourism promotion partnerships, the more effective the nation
branding strategy
Nation Branding (IV3) Hypothesis: The higher the level of public tourism promotion
investment and public-private partnerships, the higher the nation branding which
produces a positive country image perception that attracts tourism arrivals and receipts
2.7

Intervening Variable

2.7.1 Country Image Perception
a. Conceptual definition of intervening variable: the sum of beliefs, ideals, and
impressions people have toward a certain country based on interpreted information
received regardless of the nation’s real character15. In this paper, country image
perception is measured by travel destination information.

15

Country image perception—the conceptual definition is developed following a combination of concepts from the country image
literature (Nagashimu, 1970; Shields, 1991; Martin and Eroglu, 1993; and Haider et al, 1994)
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b. Conceptual definition of Travel Destination Information (TDI): interpreted
information received by potential visitors about a country from secondary (induced,
organic and autonomous information compiled from other people or through
organizations) sources that creates a perceived image of the country as a travel
destination and influences potential visitors’ travel behavior16.


Mass media reports—is a diversified collection of media technologies, in the form
of print, digital, and broadcast, that provides information to a wide public
audience17.



Travel guides— A printed or digital book that provides information and advice
about the culture, history, geographical location, accommodations, restaurants,
attractions, transportation and activities of travel destinations to actual or potential
visitors or tourists18



Travel destination surveys— Travel destination survey is a detailed investigative
study of a travel market, destination or geographical area used to collect data on
attitudes, impressions, opinions, preferences, satisfaction level by polling a
section of the population19

16

Travel destination information (TDI)—the conceptual definition is developed through a combination of concepts from the following
source: Marine-Roig, E. (2017). Measuring Destination Image through Travel Reviews in Search Engines. Sustainability, 9(8), 1425.
doi:10.3390/su9081425
17
Mass media reports—the conceptual definition is developed using a combination of definition and concepts from the following
sources: ScienceDaily-https://www.sciencedaily.com/terms/mass_media.htm; and Park, 2015: Park, Jihwan, "The Impact of Different
Types of Media on Tourists' Behavioral Intentions" (2015). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1757.
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1757
18 Travel guides—the conceptual definition is developed by me using a combination of concepts from the following sources:
Cockburn-Wootten, C., Friend, L., & McIntosh, A. (2006). A discourse analysis of representational spaces: Writings of women
independent travellers. Tourism, 54(1), 7-16.
https://www.rezdy.com/resource/travel-tourism-glossary/
https://www.worldtravelguide.net/
19
Travel destination surveys—the conceptual definition is developed using a combination of concepts from:
OECD-https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2620
Bennett C, Khangura S, Brehaut JC, Graham ID, Moher D, Potter BK, et al. (2011) Reporting Guidelines for Survey Research: An
Analysis of Published Guidance and Reporting Practices. PLoS Med 8(8): e1001069. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001069
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Travel reviews—subjective published accounts by visitors of a travel destination
that offer potential travelers with information about the travel destination,
including opinions about the country, its attractions and amenities, hotel
accommodations, restaurants and other country travel information based on the
travel review writer’s first-hand experience20



Country safety rankings— indices of compiled and analyzed data from public
sources that rank the world’s countries by safety21

c. Operationalization: The more favorable the travel destination information (mass media
reports, surveys, travel reviews and country safety rankings), the more positive a
potential traveler’s perception of a country’s image as a viable travel destination. For the
test countries, Dominican Republic and Haiti, I will measure country image perception
using travel destination information as referenced in Appendix U.
2.8

Dependent Variable

2.8.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts
a. Conceptual definition: the total number of people who travel or desire to travel, and
the total amount of money they spend to use tourist facilities and services at their travel
destination -which is located away from their places of work or residence 22. Tourism
arrivals and receipts are comprised of 1) the number of international tourism arrivals; and
2) international tourism receipts per year.

20
Travel reviews—the conceptual definition is based on my research on travel reviews (source: Trip Advisor report
https://www.tripadvisor.com/pdfs/OnlineTravelReviewReport.pdf) and my own understanding of the purpose of travel reviews.
21
Country safety rankings-- the conceptual definition is based on indices on safety rankings:
Safe Around: https://safearound.com/danger-rankings/
22
Tourism growth –the reference to tourism growth is based on an expansion of Cooper et al., 1993 (Cooper, C., Fletcher, J., Gilbert,
D., & Wanhill, S. (1993), "Tourism: principles & practice", Longman: Harlow, UK.) definition on tourism demand. I combine the
two common measurements of tourism demand namely, number of tourist arrivals and tourism receipts per year. The number of
arrivals and receipts over time is referred to as each country’s overall tourism growth.
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1. Number of international tourism arrivals23-- Refers exclusively to:
a. Tourists (overnight visitors) i.e. a visitor who stays at least one night in a
collective or private accommodation in the country visited. Same-day visitors
are not included.
b. The number of arrivals - not to the number of persons. The same person who
makes several trips to a given country during a given period will be counted as
a new arrival each time, as well as a person who travels through several
countries on one trip is counted as a new arrival each time.
2. International tourism receipts per year (ITRs)24-- ITRs are receipts earned by a
destination country from inbound tourism. The ITRs scope:
a.

ITRs cover all tourism receipts resulting from expenditure made by
visitor arrivals from abroad.

b.

Include the receipts generated by overnight as well as by same-day trips.

c.

But exclude the receipts related to international transport contracted by
residents of other countries (for instance ticket receipts from foreigners
travelling with a national company)

b. Operationalization: For the dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts, in the
Dominican Republic and Haiti I will use World Bank data for the two measurements of
tourism arrivals and receipts: a) “number of international tourism arrivals” and b)
“international tourism receipts per year” available at
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.RCPT.CD for the period 1995-2017. For
the number of international tourism arrivals and international receipts per year data, prior

23
24

Number of international tourism arrivals is defined by the UNWTO World Tourism Organization
International tourism receipts is defined by the UNWTO World Tourism Organization
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to 1995 (1960-1994), I will use statistics compiled from the following sources: a) for
Haiti: The Political Economy of Survival Reduced Haiti (Fass, 1990); The Library of
Congress Country Report on Haiti and Dominican Republic, 2001; and b) for the
Dominican Republic: The Library of Congress Country Report on Haiti and Dominican
Republic, 2001; Tourism Development in the Dominican Republic (Fuller, 1999);
Economic Growth Data Report on the Caribbean (1980-1986); and the Dominican
Republic Tourism Report (1979-1992). The higher the number of international tourism
arrivals and the higher the international tourism receipts per year, the higher the increases
in tourism arrivals and receipts.
To make comparisons of annual or period growth for each measurement of my dependent
variable, tourism arrivals and receipts, I calculate the growth rate in terms of percentage
growth. For the calculation, I used the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)
method25 to calculate the growth rate either annually or per tourism period (depends on
the available years for statistics on arrivals and receipts), for each test country; and, then I
calculated the growth rate either yearly (where available) by the entire tourism period (to
show the total rate of growth for that time). I divided the value of the arrivals and the
receipts, respectively, at the end of the period in question by its value at the
beginning of that period, raise the result to the power of one divided by the period length,
and subtracted one from the subsequent result. After the coversions, I developed a graphs
to show the variation of tourism arrivals and receipts per period.
Due to the unreliable or missing data for the DV-tourism arrivals and receipts/number of
international tourism arrivals and international tourism receipts per year from 1940-1994,

25

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cagr.asp
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I have developed the following subjective judgment operationalization: The number of
international tourism arrivals and international receipts will converted to the percentage
rate of growth (either over time if there is a gap in years between figures or yearly if the
available statistics are sequential. A scale of low, moderate and high level will be
assigned to DV(A) tourism arrivals and receipts/number of international arrivals as
follows: After obtaining the growth rate by period, I compare the growth rate results to
the average growth rate for that region during each period of time using data about the
average growth rate from the Americas from the World Tourism Organization (from
http://tourlib.net/wto/WTO_highlights_2000.pdf). According to the 2000 World Tourism
Organization Report (WTO, 2000), “Between 1950 and 1980 the number of international
arrivals corresponded to an average growth rate of 7% for the Caribbean region. My
starting point for all tourism arrivals and receipts scales covering the tourism time periods
in this paper (1940-2016) is to place any number under the “average growth rate” under
the “low” category. Any number within 2% over the average growth rate is “moderate”
and 3% over the average growth rate is high. The average tourism arrivals and receipts
rate scale (for 1950-1980) is as follows: a “low” average tourism arrivals and receipts rate
corresponds to 0-6.99%; a “moderate” average tourism arrivals and receipts rate
corresponds to 7-9.99%; and a high average tourism arrivals and receipts rate
corresponds to 10%-above. According to the 2017 World Tourism Organization Report
(WTO, 2017), the number of international arrivals in the Caribbean region for the period,
1980-1995, corresponded to an average growth rate of 5 per cent. For the average
tourism arrivals and receipts rate scale (for 1980-1995): a “low” average growth rate of
international arrivals corresponds to 0-4.99%; a “moderate” average growth rate of
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international arrivals corresponds to 5-7.99%; and a “high” average growth rate of
international arrivals corresponds to 8% - above. Also, according to the 2017 World
Tourism Organization Report (WTO, 2017), for the scale from 1995-2016, the number of
international arrivals in the Caribbean region corresponded to an average annual growth
rate of 2.7 per cent. For the tourism arrivals and receipts rate scale (for 1995-2016): a
“low” average growth rate of international arrivals corresponds to 0-2.69%; a “moderate”
average growth rate of international arrivals corresponds to 2.7-4.99%; and a high
average growth rate of international arrivals corresponds to 5%-above.
For DV(B) tourism arrivals and receipts/number of international receipts per year, a scale
of low, moderate and high level average tourism arrivals and receipts rate of receipts will
be assigned as follows: For growth in yearly receipts, growth for the Caribbean was
approximately 10% annually between 1940 and 1990 and the receipts from tourism were
approximately 13% between 1990-2000. For years that overlap, I multiply the average
growth rate for each of the years that overlap by the number of years in each period of the
overlap. Subsequently, I add the overlapping year amounts and divide by the total
number of years to get the average growth for the period. Tourism receipt average
growth rate fell in 2000 to 3.9% (Hills and Lundgren, 1977). The average tourism
arrivals and receipts rate scale for international annual receipts (1940-1990) is as follows:
a “low” average growth rate of receipts corresponds to 0-9.99%; a “moderate” average
growth rate of receipts tourism corresponds to 10-12.99%; and a high tourism arrivals
and receipts corresponds to 13%-above. The average tourism arrivals and receipts scale
for international annual tourism receipts (for 1990-2000) is as follows: a “low” average
growth rate of receipts corresponds to 12.99%; a “moderate” average growth rate of
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receipts corresponds to13-17.99%; and a high average growth rate of receipts
corresponds to 18%-above. The average tourism arrivals and receipts scale for
international annual tourism receipts (for 2000‐2016) is as follows: a “low” average
growth rate of tourism receipts corresponds to 0-3.89%; a “moderate” average growth
rate of tourism receipts corresponds to 3.9-5.99%; and a “high” average growth rate of
tourism receipts corresponds to 6%-above.
2.9

Methodology
To investigate my question, I employ three qualitative comparative analysis case studies

evaluating the theoretical arguments presented in this study. I analyze the years when tourism
was in the nascent stage of development in the two test countries, Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, to the present (1940-2017), divided in block of twenty-year periods: 1940-1960; 19611980; 1981-2000; and 2000-2017, for most of the variables in this paper. The first case study is
an evolution of Haiti’s tourism sector, a time series comparison evaluating the individual
relationship between public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding on tourism
arrivals and receipts. In addition, I also examine the interaction of the independent variables to
create a positive country image that generates tourism arrivals and receipts. The second case
study conducts the same analysis on the Dominican Republic. Finally, the third case study
conducts a similar analysis in a comparative study between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
The statistics on the variables which comprise the independent (public safety,
infrastructure investment and nation branding), interactive (country image perception) and
dependent (tourism arrivals and receipts) variables of this study come from multiple data
sources. For the data on public safety comprised of crime rates and political stability percentile
ranks for 1940-2017, I compile and organize the major crime incidents and threats to political
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stability into the four periods of each test countries’ tourism development into tables and graphs
that indicate the crime rate and political stability level (see Appendices A-D for Haiti and
Appendices K-N for the Dominican Republic). For the information on infrastructure investment
comprised of public expenditures, private sector and public-private partnership capital
investments in infrastructure for 1940-2017 (into the four tourism development time periods), I
organize the data on infrastructure investments, classify the type of investment and the level of
investments in tables and graphs (see Appendices E-F for Haiti and Appendices O-P for the
Dominican Republic). Likewise, for the information on nation branding comprised of public and
private tourism promotion investment, I compile the data in tables and graphs for the tourism
period and categorize the investment type and level for each of the test countries (see
Appendices G-H for Haiti and Appendices Q-R for the Dominican Republic).
For the interactive variable, country image perception, there were several forms of travel
destination information sources (from mass media reports, travel guides, travel reviews and
country safety rankings) that provided either favorable or unfavorable reviews of Haiti and the
Dominican Republic, respectively. I examined each of the data sources and provided a
categorical scale for the country perception for Haiti and Dominican Republic divided in tenyear time intervals covering 1940-2018 (see Appendix I for Haiti and Appendix S for the
Dominican Republic). Finally, the statistics for tourism arrivals and receipts for 1940-2017 were
provided by the World Bank and various country reports on Haiti and the Dominican Republic or
Caribbean regional reports. I organized the raw data into spreadsheet and developed graphs to
show the variation of tourism graph over designated tourism period covered in this paper. Then,
I assigned a scale level for international arrivals and receipts for each of the test countries (see
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Appendices J for Haiti’s tourism arrivals and receipts and Appendices T for the Dominican
Republic’s tourism arrivals and receipts).
For each of the variables of this paper, scaled categories were defined as subjective
judgements to compensate for either missing, unreliable or unreported information. The scaled
categories, for each variable, are compatible to make analysis of the relationship between them
more transparent. After the designating the scaled ratings for each variable, I compiled a final
table comprised of all the variables of this paper and their corresponding rating for both test
countries namely, Haiti and the Dominican Republic (see Tables 3.1 and 4.1 on the following
pages). I will use these tables as the basis for the three case study analyses.
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Table 3.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts in Haiti (1940-2016): Scaled ratings based on
analysis of data compiled for each variable
Tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti (1940-2016)
Interactive
Variable

Dependent
Variable
Tourism arrivals
and receipts
Country
(average growth
rate percentages
image
perception were calculated)27

Independent Variables

Public Safety

Tourism
Periods26
Pre-Tourism
1930-1940

Golden
Tourism
1940-1980
Deprived
Tourism
1981-2010
Rejuvenated
Tourism
2011-2016

Crime
Rates
28

Low

Political
Stability

High

Moderate
Moderate
(19401955)
Unstable
(19561971)
Moderate
(19721980)
Moderate
(19811982)
Unstable

High29

Unstable30

Low

Infrastructure
Investment
Public &
PublicPrivate
(PPP)
Private
High
(1930-1940) Low

Nation Branding
PublicPublic
private
Travel
Tourism
tourism
Destination
Promotion promotion Information Arrivals
Low

N/A

Receipts

N/A

N/A

High
(14%)

High
(14%)

Low
(1940-1960)
Moderate
(1961-1980)

Moderate Low

N/A
Positive
(19401963)
Negative
(19641971)
Positive
(1972Moderate 1980)

Low

Low

Low

Low

Negative

Low
(-0.30%)

Low
(8%)

High

High

Low

High

Negative

High
(13.9%)

Low
(3%)

26
The names of each tourism period are loosely based on based on Hugues Séraphin’s 2016 study on marketing to diaspora community, which
categorized the level of tourism that existed during those times
27
Tourism growth (in terms of absolute numbers over time)—no figures available prior to tourism starting in Haiti in 1945
28
The ratings for each scale are reported except as footnoted as there may be deviations in terms of how data sources report their scaled statistics
inconsistent with the scales used in this report.
29
OSAC (2012-2017) Reports on Haiti rated the crime level as “critical” in their scale whereas the scale of this study classifies it as “high”
instead
30
WGI indicators indicate levels of political stability for Haiti that would classify the country as “unstable”. However, the indicator is based
solely on measuring “absence of violence” as a security risk measurement; this indicator does not indicate the potential governance level which
would provide a better measurement for stable government (such as governance and the effectiveness of its government institutions, rule of law
and corruption levels
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Table 4.1 Tourism arrivals and receipts in the Dominican Republic (1930-2016): Scaled
ratings based on analysis of data compiled for each variable
Tourism arrivals and receipts in the Dominican Republic (1930-2016)
Interactive
Variable

Independent Variables

Public Safety

Tourism
Periods

Political
Stability

Crime
Rates31

Pre- Tourism
1930-196032 Moderate

Early
Tourism
1961-1980
Golden
Tourism
1981-2000
Golden
Tourism
2000-2016

Infrastructure
Investment
Public &
PublicPrivate
(PPP)
Private

Travel
Destination
Information

Arrivals

Receipts

Low

Low

High
(16%)

High
(32%)

High

Low
Low
(19611967)
High
(after
1967)

Nonexistent
Low
(19611970)
High
(after
1970)

Negative
Negative
(19611969)
Positive
(from
1971)

High

High

High

High

Positive

High
(10%)

High
(15%)

High

High

High

High

Positive

High
(5%)

High
(6%)

High

High

Moderate High
Unstable
(19611975)
Moderate
(19761980)
High

High

Moderate

HighCritical33

Moderate

3

Nation Branding
PublicPublic
private
Tourism
tourism
Promotion promotion

Country
image
perception

Dependent Variable
Tourism arrivals and
receipts (average
growth rate
percentages were
calculated)

ANALYSIS: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

As indicated in the methodology section of this paper, I analyze the theory of this paper
in this section and conduct hypothesis tests on two countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic
to determine if there is an impact tourism arrivals and receipts as predicted.
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The ratings for each scale are reported except as footnoted as there may be deviations in terms of how data sources report their
scaled statistics inconsistent with the scales used in this report.
32
While tourism was non-existent in the Dominican Republic until 1971, this period is included to show overall variance with later
periods; and to remain consistent with the period for comparison purposes with Haiti
33
OSAC (2012-2017) Reports on the Dominican Republic rated the crime level as “high” (2001-2014) and then “critical” in their
scale from 2015-2017 and the data on crime levels per homicides supports this rating
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3.1

Haiti Tourism Case Study (1940-2017)

3.1.1 Public Safety
From the time that Haiti’s tourism sector began developing in the mid-1940s, the Haitian
government continually declared that it was crime free up until 1986 when crime rates began
rising considerably. Tourists, prior to 1986, enjoyed attractions and resorts that were “virtually
free of street crime” (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Moreover, aside from
instances where the country experienced political instability: 1) during 1956-57, when President
Paul Magloire was overthrown for attempting to extend his constitutional term of office
(Haggerty, 1989) and the country experienced five governments within a nine-month period; and
2) during President Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier’s administration from 1962-1971, the country
was moderately stable until Duvalier’s son, Jean Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier was overthrown
in 1986 (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Haggerty, 1989). Tourism arrivals and
receipts was high through Haiti’s “Golden Tourism Period” (1940-1980), as it averaged a total
growth rate of 14% for international arrivals and international receipts. This figure was double
the regional growth rate of 7% for international arrivals in the Caribbean; and, Haiti was also
faring higher than the growth rates for international receipts which was 10% (see Appendices J.1
and J.2). As there were bouts of political instability, the rate of tourism arrivals and receipts (in
terms of international arrivals as international receipts data is sporadic) slowed before picking
back up in 1972 after Jean Claude Duvalier instituted many policies favoring private investment
geared towards tourism development (Country Report, 2001).
In 1945, when tourism started, Haiti’s international arrivals was 5,000. By 1956, arrivals
grew to 67,000 (nearly 5.5 times the amount of its 1950 figure-12,000 arrivals). In 1963, during
Francois Duvalier’s brutal dictatorship, the arrivals fell to under 50,000; but, they climbed to

50

over 159,000 by 1972 after Jean Claude Duvalier took office and kept rising until its peak in
1979 with 338,900 (Figure 3.2). From 1980-1986, during which political unrest was beginning
to stir leading to Jean Claude Duvalier’s ouster in 1986, tourism arrivals and receipts remained at
moderate levels; however, the number of arrivals was slowly declining while the tourism receipts
from 1979-1984 was steadier (Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3-1 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1945-1984)
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Figure 3-2 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1995-2015)
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Tourism receipts in Haiti 1950-2015
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Figure 3-3 International receipts in Haiti between 1950-2015
Following Jean-Claude Duvalier’s coup in 1986, a long-standing history of political
instability began to plague Haiti. The country had 18 regime changes of government between
1986 and 2014 with former presidents Leslie Manigat ousted in a coup in 1988 and Jean
Bertrand Aristide overthrown in 1991 (he was restored in 1994 and finished his term in 1996)
and 2004 (after returning to power in 2001) (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001).
Furthermore, since the crime rate levels were simultaneously rising around 1986 (and a rumor
arose linking the origin of the AIDS virus to Haiti in 1982), tourism arrivals and receipts in terms
of overnight visitors severely declined to stagnant levels. While Haiti’s cruise ship tourism began
to significantly rise in the 2000s, the dynamics of Haiti’s tourism sector concerning overnight
visitors transitioned from a mass tourism contender to a niche tourism market of diaspora,
business and aid/missionary travelers. Haiti’s inability to manage public safety since 1986
appears to be a major contributing factor in the decline of overall tourism arrivals and receipts.
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Haiti’s military forces, the Forces Armees d’Haiti (FAd’H), had been policing the
country, as Haiti had no national police force until one was instituted in 1989 (Library of
Congress Country Report, 2001). Fad’H found itself unable to combat the severe security and
crime the country was facing by the late 1980s was inadequate. Despite the Haitian National
Police (HNP) finally being instituted, managing crime has remained a major challenge for the
country. After Jean Bertrand Aristide’s coup in 2004, the United Nations sent peacekeeping
forces (MINUSTAH) for 13 years to assist the HPN and bring stability to the country. However,
MINUSTAH’s legacy is a reported mixture of partial success and disaster. The mission was
blamed for bringing the cholera to the country post-Haiti’s 2010 earthquake and 134 members of
MINUSTAH have been accused of sexual assault crimes (Johnston, 2017). While MINUSTAH
has been credited with restoring some stability (the slight rise of which is evident in Appendix D
from 2009-2016), the country remains classified as “unstable” according to the World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) measuring the likeliness of political instability and/or
politically motivated violence. Unfortunately, the classification was confirmed as Haiti’s recent
bout of violent protests in Haiti stranded several missionary groups, mostly from the United
States.
A recent report by the U.S. Department of State on Haiti, indicates that the Haitian
National Police has been underreporting the country’s crime rates. The underreporting of crime
insinuates that Haiti is statistically safer than its Caribbean counterparts (OSAC Report, 2018).
Haiti, like many countries in its region, had not been providing reliable data on recorded crimes
for several years. In fact, recoding systems for crime reporting were not instituted in Haiti until
2000 (UNODC Report, 2002). For the last seven years that OSAC has reported on Haiti, the
U.S. Department of State has been classifying Haiti’s crime rate levels as “critical” (OSAC
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Reports, 2012-2018); however, the scale for crime rates in this paper classifies Haiti as “high”
due to its reported homicide estimates from 1999-2016 as well as the limited data available for
other forms of crime (see Table 3.1 in the Methodology section; and, Appendix A and B for
Haiti’s specific crime rate information).
3.1.2 Infrastructure Investment
Haiti’s overall infrastructure has been considered poor quality and a deterrent to
sustainable tourism in terms of increased overnight visitor arrivals (cruise ship travelers are often
insulated from being impacted by infrastructure problems as the cruise lines are “all-inclusive”
sea resorts where traveler’s do not remain overnight). Prior to the advent of the country’s
tourism sector in 1945, the United States was occupied in Haiti and invested extensively in
building Haiti’s infrastructure in terms of roads, bridges, canals, public buildings,
telecommunications, water and sewage. This massive investment contributed to the start of the
country’s tourism infrastructure. By 1980, the public and public-private investment in
infrastructure continued to grow with paved road projects constructed in Haiti’s major cities as
well as the construction of an 80-mile from Port au Prince to Cap Hatien, i.e. “Route de L’Amitie
Franco Hatienne (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Also, by 1980, private investment
in terms of hotel accommodations increased from under 1,000 in 1941 to 2,000 rooms in 1960 to
3,000 rooms in 1980. The rate of hotel development during that time, to accommodate the rate
of tourism arrivals and receipts Haiti was experiencing, was rapid as Haiti went from having low
number of hotels at the start of its tourism sector to a moderate level. Examining the relationship
between infrastructure from 1930-1980, the level of investment in infrastructure appears to be
positively correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts which grew high during that period.
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Since 1980, public investment in infrastructure (which, in the indices of this paper on
infrastructure level, is combined with public-private partnerships (PPI) in infrastructure; this is
because infrastructure projects (electricity, transportation, ports, water and sewage) are usually
funded by a combination of public and public-private-partnership capital) has been rated low
(see Table 3.1 in the Methodology section; and, Appendix E and F for Haiti’s Infrastructure
Investment index and graphs). During 1981-2000, infrastructure projects did not exceed $500
million (Preeg, 1996; Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). According to the PPI Index,
private participation in infrastructure, which is important for governments to secure to finance
the extensive capital required for infrastructure projects, totaled just $129 million (to illustrate
the stark contrast in investment, a comparison with the Dominican Republic’s PPI investment
will be discussed in the third case study of this paper). Also, private investment receded when
the number of hotel rooms decreased from 3000 in 1980 to 800 by 1999 due to a loss of tourism
arrivals and receipts (to be explained further in the discussion on the interactive effects of
country image perception). Moreover, for the period 2001-2017, a high level of private capital
was allocated to build or improve infrastructure in Haiti, especially after the 2010 earthquake.
However, only a fraction of the amount allocated was disbursed; and, accordingly, few
infrastructure projects pledged were executed (PEMFAR Accountability Report, 2008; U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GOA) Report, 2013)). For example, from the United States,
$1.14 billion was granted by Congress and USAID pledged $651 million to building Haiti’s
infrastructure which had amassed nearly $13.2 billion in damages (IADB Country Report, 2013;
GOA Report, 2013). Despite this allocation, only $203 million was disbursed by the end of the
accountability of funds period in 2013. Further, a $260 million project proposed in 2013 to
develop ecotourism in Ile-la-Vache was halted in 2015. Haiti did have some success with its
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telecommunications sector due to the Haitian government signing a public-private partnership
with the Vietnam telecommunication company, Viettel, for nearly $100 million to upgrade
infrastructure and services. Post-earthquake, it was one of the highest delivered capital
investment in infrastructure projects to be completed.
Pending infrastructure amounts pledged and outstanding amounts allocated, but not yet
disbursed, represent opportunities for increasing tourism arrivals and receipts for Haiti. During
the 2000-2017, private investment in terms of hotel accommodations increased from 2,000
rooms in 2010 to nearly 4,322 by 2015 (Export.gov, 2017). After the earthquake, several hotels
needed to be rebuilt and aid workers and missionaries involved in the reconstruction needed
lodging. Minister of Tourism Stephanie Villedrouin acknowledged the post-earthquake growth
in a 2015 article with the Haitian publication, Le Nouvelliste, and indicated that direct
investments to tourism were $345 million (a moderate level amount according to the scale of this
paper) (Le Nouvelliste, 2015). Further, she stated that Haiti saw a 40% increase in hotel rooms
from 2011 to 2015 and claimed that the total number of hotel rooms was 9,280 (with 4,861
“classified rooms of international standard of 1 to 5 hibiscus rating, in 177 hotels). Despite the
disparity in number of reported hotel rooms, private investment infrastructure from 2011-2018
has been rated as high. Tourism arrivals and receipts (the most recent numbers for all types of
arrivals) for 2014 show Haiti had 1,127,577 visitors (662,403 cruise passengers and 465,174
regular tourists) with a reported increase of nearly 11% in the number of regular tourists
compared to the prior year. In 2014, Haiti’s rate of increase for tourism arrivals was 13.9
percent, over 5 times the regional average of 2.7% (see Appendices J for Haiti’s average growth
rates for each period of its tourism development).
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3.1.3 Nation Branding
Haiti’s nation branding efforts from the inception of its tourism sector prior to the time
where it experienced public safety challenges, during the 1940-1980 period, mostly relied upon
public-private tourism promotion. The government allocated public funds to promoting tourism.
However, according to a 1973 Organization of American States (OAS) Audit Report, Haiti’s
tourism promotion budget was poorly allocated (OAS Audit Report, 1973). Nearly 60% of the
total budget went to the salaries of the large staff that was employed at the National Tourist
Office (OAS Audit Report, 1973). Due to the misallocation, only a small amount remained for
promotion, public relations efforts, publicity and literature (i.e. advertising brochures, flyers). As
a result, public spending on marketing promotions was low. Reported public-private partnership
in tourism promotion involving mostly private sector funding was at a moderate level in the form
of airlines, hotel investors and travel agencies. During the initial period of Haiti’s tourism sector
development, it experienced a high growth rate of tourism. While its arrivals and receipts
(tourism arrivals and receipts, this paper’s dependent variable) were at moderate levels compared
to its region by 1956 with 67,000 visitors, from the time tourism started in Haiti in 1945 with
5,000 visitors to 10,788 in 1951, it grew tremendously in just over 10 years (Seraphin, 2011).
Haiti received nearly 6 times the number of visitors in a five-year period 1951-1956.
During the 1981-2010, public investment in marketing promotions continued to remain at
low levels. Haiti had experienced setbacks in its tourism sector development and tourism
arrivals and receipts had stagnated. There appeared to be several reasons for this unfortunate
reversal. In 1982, a rumor associated the origin of the AIDS disease to Haiti ((Library of
Congress Country Report, 2001). By then, political unrest had begun against President Jean
Claude Duvalier’s dictatorship culminating in his ouster in 1986 and decades of political
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instability and increasing crime levels (World Bank Country Report, 1987; Library of Congress
Country Report, 2001). In response, the Haitian government retreated their nation branding
efforts instead of employing nation branding crises management promotional strategies. Once
tourism stagnated the country: 1) closed its tourism offices in 4 locations globally namely, New
York, Miami, Paris, and Canada (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Fass, 1988); 2)
removed its Ministry of Tourism department in 1986; and 3) reduced its allocated budget for
tourism promotion by 1994.
In terms of thousands of visitors, from 1987 to 2004, Haiti saw a reduction of 54% of
arrivals (from 239,200 of all arrivals to 108,868) (Seraphin, 2011). Haiti attempted to revitalize
its tourism industry in the mid-1990s and early 2000s prior to the 2010 earthquake; but, nation
branding strategic efforts such as promoting the city of Jacmel were continually hampered by the
country’s public safety and infrastructure weaknesses (Seraphin 2011). After the earthquake in
2010, the country began attempting to revitalize tourism with more concrete results evident in its
level of arrivals and receipts outside of its more successful cruise sector. In 2011, the
government appointed a Stephanie Villedrouin as Minister of Tourism, who quickly began
strong efforts to rebrand Haiti in the wake of proposed and received aid to rebuild the country.
The “Why Not Haiti” slogan was initiated and began appearing on the Ministry of Tourism
website as well as promotional advertising literature. Within 5 years, Haiti was included in
World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Index for the first time; but, it was ranked low for
tourism marketing promotions. Assessing the amount that the Haitian government spends on
tourism promotion, based on the percent share of total tourism expenditure for 1995-2017, the
WEF Report (2015) reported that Haiti’s levels ranged from 1.7% in 1995 to 3% from 1999 to
2017). Consistent with the scale of this paper on nation branding (public spending on tourism
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promotion) levels, the percentages demonstrate a continued trend of low public investment in
marketing promotions. By contrast, public-private tourism marketing (another component of
nation branding tourism promotional investment) has been high in terms of branded hotel
promotions built after the 2010 earthquake and continued cruise ship promotions during the
2011-2017 period.
3.1.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception
Examining tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti from 1940-2016, as indicated in Table
3.1, at times, there appears to be a correlated individual relationship between each of the
independent variables and tourism arrivals and receipts except for the public safety variable level
in Haiti’s most recent tourism period (2011-2016). For public safety during 1940-1980, when
crime was reported as low, tourism arrivals and receipts were high. Furthermore, when crime
was high during the time tourism was deprived (1981-2010), Haiti’s tourism sector had a -0.30%
average tourism arrivals and receipts rate (see Appendix J.3). Political stability, the other
measurement of public safety created much variance with the dependent variable, throughout
Haiti’s tourism periods. Tourism arrivals and receipts were affected each time the country
experienced political instability. Likewise, the infrastructure investment levels, public and
private, seemed to be correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts; however, there was no
evidence that infrastructure investment made a direct change in tourism arrivals and receipts.
This could be attributed to the periods where there was political instability (a public safety issue)
and the overall tourism arrivals and receipts was adversely affected during those periods because
of the reduction of arrivals and receipts. Likewise, during that time, nation branding strategies to
counteract the effect of the public safety situation was at moderate levels (with moderate
investments invested by the private sector for tourism promotion and low investments coming
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from the public sector).

Despite the modes of instability during the first half of Haiti’s tourism

sector development, the overall perception of the country remained positive and tourism was
growing at a high rate.
During the 1981-2010 “Deprived Tourism” period, it is evident that there is a greater
impact that public safety levels have on tourism arrivals and receipts with the additive effect of
low infrastructure investments (from both the public and private sectors) and a retreat in the
country’s nation branding (characterized by low tourism promotion investments by the public
and private sectors) on the image of the country. Travel destination information had reached
potential international visitors during that time about Haiti’s political instability problems.
Crime levels were not highlighted in the travel destination information I reviewed. However,
political instability reports, along with the AIDS rumor, appeared to be sufficient to create the
perception that the country posed a threat to public safety (as tourism arrivals and receipts
plummeted during that time). While the public safety challenge appears to persist, according to
reports from OSAC and country safety rankings, there seems to be some steady increases of
tourism arrivals and receipts –especially since the 2010 earthquake. Strong infrastructure
investments from the private sector in terms of increased hotel rooms to accommodate the
significant number of projects developing to rebuild the country is likely a contributing factor.
However, nation branding promotions in terms of public-private tourism promotion can also
have an impact as Haiti has recently been included in country rank indexes on global
competitiveness. Furthermore, the travel destination information sources, which make up the
country image perception interactive variable in this study, had some positive information mixed
with the mostly negative reviews of the country during the 2010-2017 period (as evidenced in
Appendix I and Appendix U-the works cited for Appendix I). The Igarape Institute reported on
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Haiti’s recent tourism potential that “given the relatively low incidence of criminal victimization,
the perception of Haiti at arrival to departure…overall tourists felt safer than expected during
their stay”34. In line with the theory of this paper, there were no positive travel destination
information discovered for 1990-2009 when public safety, infrastructure investment and nation
branding were at low levels that corresponded to the lowest growth period in Haiti’s tourism
history.
3.2

Dominican Republic Case Study (1940-2017)

3.2.1 Public Safety
As of 2001, crime rate statistics were not published by the Dominican Republic;
however, daily newspapers in Santo Domingo did regularly report criminal incidents (Library of
Congress Country Report, 2001). During the country “Pre-Tourism” period (1930-1960), crime
was estimated at moderate levels as the country had a strong and structured national police force
that had been instituted in 1936. Also, during this time, political stability was at moderate levels.
The country was under the 31- year presidency of Rafael Le6nidas Trujillo Molina whose brutal
dictatorship style of leadership produced stability until 1961 when he was assassinated. During
that time, tourism was virtually non-existent in the Dominican Republic with no more than 500
reported visitors. Following Trujillo’s assassination, the Dominican Republic experience
political instability for the next five years and existing crime incidents grew to high levels.
By 1980, the country was moderately stable politically. However, despite a strong police
force of 10,000, crime in the form of drug trafficking, homicides, rape and robbery as well as
counterfeiting and extortion were still major concerns for the country and at high levels (Library
of Congress Country Report, 2001). After tourism began in 1967, the Dominican Republic

34

https://igarape.org.br/en/is-tourism-haitis-magic-bullet-an-empirical-treatment-of-haitis-tourism-potential/
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experienced unprecedent average rates of increase in tourism arrivals and receipts. In 1971, four
years after the country opens its Ministry of Tourism, the first international arrivals are recorded
at 137,000 tourists (overnight stays and cruise passengers) (Fuller, 1999) with an average
tourism arrivals and receipt rate of 16% for international arrivals and 32% for international
receipts (see Appendices T, T.1-T.5). The country’s average growth rate exceeded the
Caribbean’s regional average tourism arrivals and receipts rate of 7% for arrivals and 10% for
receipts. After 1971, the country’s tourism sector soared beyond any other country in its region
with arrivals reaching 747,000 in 1986, 1,181,000 in 1991, and 2,211,000 in 1997 (Fuller, 1999).
In terms of international tourism receipts, in 1979, tourism receipts were US$124 million
equivalent and rose to US$0.9 billion by 1989 (Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds.
Draft Case study, World Bank 2011). Through 1981-2000, crime remained at high levels while a
moderate level of stability was maintained. Likewise, in recent years 2001-2017 (according to
the most recent numbers on crime-see Appendices K and L; and, for political stability-see
Appendices M and N), stability as remained at moderate levels according to the World
Governance Index (ranking in the 45.21 percentile in 1996 and 57.14 percentile in 2016).
However, crime rates have increased to critical levels according to the homicide rates reported
(other forms of crime have not been readily reported). OSAC Reports declared that Dominican
Republic’s crime rate was at a critical level in 2015 as homicide rates hard reached 30.9 per
100,000 of inhabitants (OSAC, 2015-2017). However, by 2017, other global reports indicated
that crime was at a level of 14.9 per 100,000 inhabitants (World Health Organization Report
EFE, 2017). This figure is still classified as a high rate of crime according to this paper’s scale
on crime rate levels. Concerning the individual impact of public safety on tourism arrivals and
receipts, it appears that the moderately stable level of the Dominican Republic political
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environment may be sufficient to not adversely impact the level of tourism arrivals and receipts
(as political stability has been identified in previous literature as important for tourism demand).
3.2.2 Infrastructure Investment
The Dominican Republic has been consistent in continually seeking to improve its
infrastructure in order to develop more resorts, ecotourism and attract more cruise tourism. From
1967-2017, public spending (combined with the public-private sector partnerships in
infrastructure) and private sector (number of hotel rooms) indicate a high level of investment in
infrastructure (see Appendix O) that appears to be positively correlated with tourism arrivals and
receipts. The Dominican Republic received extensive assistance from the United States to
develop infrastructure during its occupation of the country during the Trujillo dictatorship
(Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). The public (along with PPI) investment in
infrastructure has maintained high levels, either for development or improvements of all types of
infrastructure, ever since the 1940s. From 1970-1980, the Dominican Republic uses public funds
to invest in the country’s physical infrastructure. The country develops INFRATUR (the
Department of Investment and Infrastructure) and uses $76 million from the World Bank to
develop a malecon and other tourist infrastructure in Puerto Plata (Fuller, 1999; Dominican
Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case study, World Bank, 2011). In addition, by 1974, the
private sector investment had provided an infrastructure investment of 3,800 rooms (up from
1,000 rooms in 1960 and 1,600 rooms in 1974) (Fuller, 1999; Library of Congress Country
Report, 2001; and Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case study, World Bank,
2011).
By the end of 2000, the Dominican Republic had completed a large transportation
infrastructure project funded by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to
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improve maintenance systems (Country Report, 2001). At the end of 2000, hotel rooms had
reached 45,000. Private sector investment in infrastructure had reached high levels where 8,562
rooms existed in the country by the late 1980s and 21,500 by 1991 (Fuller, 1999). Presently, the
Dominican Republic has over 60,000 rooms, the highest in the Caribbean. In addition, the PPI
(Private Participation in Infrastructure) index on public-private partnerships in infrastructure
reported a total investment of US$5,581 (in millions) from 1990-2017 for 33 projects covering
the following sectors: airports, electricity, ports and roads (PPI Index, 1990-2017; also, see
Appendix P). Furthermore, as of 2016, statistics on international arrivals recorded numbers of
5,959,300 overnight visitors for the Dominican Republic and international receipts of US$6,723
(millions) (World Bank World Development Indicators). Considering the high levels of
investment in infrastructure and the high level of tourism arrivals and receipts, there appears to
be a positively correlated relationship between infrastructure investment and tourism arrivals and
receipts.
3.2.3 Nation Branding
Nation branding did not become a major priority for the Dominican Republic until after
Trujillo was assassinated in 1961; and, after the 5-year period of instability (with persistent
unrest until 1975) that directly followed his dictatorship ended (Library of Congress Country
Report, 2001). Since 1967, the government has been proactive to develop tourism through high
investments levels of public and public-private tourism promotion partnerships by passing
legislation related to tourism sector development and promotion. First, the government
appointed a Minister of Tourism in 1967 (But, the Department of Ministry of Tourism did not
open until 1981; see Figure 3.4). Then, the Dominican Republic passed the 1971 Tourist law to
incentivize private tourism promotion (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Dominican
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Republic: Defying the Odds Case Study, World Bank, 2011; Gonzalez et al, 2012). In 1979, the
government allocated US$2 million for the international promotion of the country’s “Come to
the land that Columbus loved best” campaign (Fuller, 1999). Further, during the 1970s, the
government pursued private partnership investments to develop the first resort in Punta Cana.
This initial private investment leads to numerous private sector partnerships with the government
(Fuller, 1999; Library of Congress, 2001; Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case
study, World Bank, 2011). During the 1980s, a Spain-Dominican cooperative tourism
development project allows for several Spanish branded hotels to develop in the Dominican
Republic and promote tourism. In 2000, INFRATUR, the Dominican Republic’s Central Bank
for public finance of tourism promotion and infrastructure projects creates a special fund to
promote tourism (Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case study, World Bank, 2011).
In 1992, the Tourism Incentives Law was repealed and replaced by the tax law of the country;
but, it was later reinstated to accompany the Tourism Promotion Fund that was set up to cover
nation branding expenses (Gonzalez et al, 2012).
The World Economic Forum’s Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Insight Reports
(2007-2018) has consistently ranked the Dominican Republic’s public tourism promotion
investment as high (over 20% of total tourism expenditure is devoted to tourism promotion).
The World Bank’s World Trade and Tourism Council data set provides government spending on
travel and tourism for the Dominican Republic’s for 1995 to 2018 (See Appendix R). According
to the high levels of nation branding, for the Dominican Republic, this independent variable is
positively correlated with the level of tourism arrivals and receipts for the country.
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3.2.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception
In analyzing the scaled ratings, for each of the variables in Table 4.1 for the Dominican
Republic, most of the individual relationships between the independent variables of this paper specifically, infrastructure investment and nation branding, establish a positive correlation with
the level of tourism arrivals and receipts. This is consistent with the literature on tourism
demand as well as the theoretical expectations in this study. The higher the infrastructure
investment and the higher the nation branding investment (public and private spending for both
variable), the higher the level of tourism arrivals and receipts. However, the public safety
independent variable, comprised of crime rate levels and political stability rankings, produces
an outlier relationship that is not consistent with the theory of this thesis. In this study, the
higher the public safety level, the higher the tourism arrivals and receipts. However, the crime
rate level for the Dominican Republic has been consistently high through the entire period of
tourism development for the country (1967-2017).
Alternatively, the other variable that comprises public safety, political stability, was
unstable from 1961-1975; however, the country has enjoyed a moderate level of political
stability since that time. The reason for the deviation could be that crime rate does not have
much of a bearing on tourism arrivals and receipts. Another reason could be that the
independent variable public safety provides enough of a security assurance for travelers if
political stability is at least at moderate levels. In that case, then the theory about political
stability as a security measure, under the public safety variable, would be positively correlated
with tourism arrivals and receipts. Finally, it is also probable that the combination of high
levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding offset the lower levels of public safety
risk created by the higher levels of crime. The implication is that even with lower levels of
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public safety, tourism arrivals and receipts can be high if infrastructure and nation branding
investments are high. As those two variables can create a positive country image that offsets
any negative reports provided by the travel destination information sources on public safety.
In examining the country image perception during the country’s tourism development, when
the country image perception was negative, tourism arrivals and receipts were low. Likewise,
when the country image perception was positive, tourism arrivals and receipts were high. This
is consistent with the theory of this paper. In one recent travel destination information source,
Safe Around (2017), the Dominican Republic is ranked as 106/128 for safety (see Appendix S
for the Dominican Republic’s Country Image Perception Scale). However, the UL Safety
Index (2017), ranks the country as average 59/100 for safety concerns. Also, while one mass
media report, the Daily Mail in the U.K., indicates that the country has a high murder rate,
which was confirmed by the WHO EFE, 2017 report, nearly all travel reviews and guides (for
2010-2017) have reported the Dominican Republic as safe for travel. Moreover, a travel
survey - the Canadian Omni Survey (2012) - polled 1,002 surveyors and 7/10 view the country
as safe for travel.
3.3

Haiti and Dominican Republic Comparative Case Study (1940-2017)

3.3.1 Public Safety
In assessing the scaled ratings of each variable under public safety (Tables 3.1 and 4.1 in
the Methodology section of this paper), the public safety levels for the Dominican Republic
(Table 4.1) show that crime levels (from 1961-2016) have been high in the country - even while
political stability has been at a moderate level. Despite these findings, tourism arrivals and
receipts (yearly arrivals and receipts) has been persistently high for the country its Early Tourism
Period (1961-1980). For Haiti, crime rates were reported low while political stability ranged
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from unstable to moderate levels during the time it enjoyed its highest rates of tourism arrivals
and receipts (1940-1980). After political instability became prevalent and crime rate rose in
1986, tourism arrivals and receipts stalled for Haiti. While political instability does threaten
safety and security at tourist destination, high levels of crime should create a more immediate
concern for travelers who may be direct targets for criminals. However, the findings of this
paper do not support that assumption.
The Dominican Republic’s public safety levels is perceived higher than Haiti’s, even
though crime has been high in both countries. In examining the reasons for this puzzle, it is
importance to look at the functional security benefits that the Dominican Republic provides
potential travelers when it comes to ensuring their safety. The Dominican Republic, as part of
their tourism promotion strategies implemented specific safety measures to insulate travelers
from the crime levels that persist in the country. The country has a national police force of over
10,000 members; however, they also instituted a “special police force” to provide security for
tourist areas (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014). Since 2000, the Tourist Police (POLITUR)-made a
department of the Ministry of Tourism by a presidential decree-has provided security to the
tourism zones created by the Dominican government. In 2014, the government passed the
Organic Law of the Armed Forces (No. 139-13), which transformed the Tourist Police into
Tourist Security Specialized Corps (CESTUR) (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014). The goal of the
law is to upgrade the efficiency of the security plan being promoted by the Dominican
government. With law No. 139-13, CESTUR is transformed from a department of the Ministry
of Tourism to a department of the Ministry of Defense (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014). As a
member of the Defense Corps for National Security, CESTUR is defined in the new law as
“specialized working units, made up by chosen members of the military institutions, with the aim
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of providing security and protection in certain strategic areas vital for guaranteeing national
interests.” (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014). The creation of CESTUR demonstrates a high level
of planning, investment and coordination of the Dominican Republic’s key government
institutions-their Ministry of Tourism and Department of Defense. As part of their promotional
campaign, the Ministry of Tourism has included information about the tourist police as a
preemptive strike against any travel warnings coming from the outbound country threatening the
image of the country. The special tourist police have been noted by travelers who express
feeling safe through travel reviews. One traveler on the popular travel review site, Trip Advisor,
noted “Very fun and safe to walk the streets, tourist police are everywhere” (TripAdvisor, 2016).
3.3.2 Infrastructure Investment
As established in the tourism demand literature, quality infrastructure is important for
tourism; and, as theorized in this paper, continued investments to improve all forms of
inadequate infrastructure is necessary to increase tourism arrivals and receipts. When tourism
stagnated in Haiti, its public infrastructure spending and its private sector investments in
infrastructure were simultaneously at low and moderate levels considering the country needed
quality infrastructure. Following Crouch (2011), it is up to countries to supply destination
attractiveness in the form of quality infrastructure (i.e. adequate accommodation and
transportation networks). Destinations with a strong infrastructure forge the type of functional
benefits that potential tourists demand. To achieve destination attractiveness extensive
investments in infrastructure must be made. Infrastructure investments are made possible
through government partnerships with the private sector (public-private participation in
infrastructure).

69

Despite the high amounts of capital pledged by various funding sources, the execution of
infrastructure projects remain slow in Haiti relative to the high need for better infrastructure.
Haiti’s water and sewage system have been operating below capacity for a long time. Despite
international aid pledged to improve the sanitation infrastructure all over the country, project
plans have not progressed in the last five years passed the initial stages (Reddy, 2017). In
addition, the one treatment plant that was completed is underperforming because cost allocations
were misdirected leading to a shortage to cover plant maintenance and payroll.
By contrast, the Dominican Republic’s investments in infrastructure have been
consistently high-especially through its partnerships with the private sector. Allocated capital
has been disbursed to cover infrastructure projects; and, moreover, projects have been
successfully completed. The infrastructure investments could be attributed to a high private
sector investor confidence in allocating and disbursing large capital to the country. This
indicates that compared to the Dominican Republic, Haiti has longstanding problems with
governance.

A 2008 Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review

(PEMFAR) Country Report on Haiti (World Bank, 2008), a collaboration between the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and the Government of Haiti discusses the
challenges Haiti faces managing public expenditures, public spending allocation and securing
private sector investment on infrastructure. As discussed previously in this paper, Haiti has not
always completed projects from disbursed capital for infrastructure improvements. The
PEMFAR Report (2008) advised Haiti that effective management of aid flows was vital.
Further, the country needed to improve its level of financial governance by continuing economic
governance reform initiatives that began in 2004. It appears that plans to increase accountability,
transparency and efficiency in the use of public capital to “ensure that public investment
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translates into accumulation of capital and growth” (PEMFAR Report, 2008), were not fully
implemented. The same report noted that relative to the need, government expenditure on
infrastructure and security were low.
3.3.3 Nation Branding
The test countries in this case study comparison have two different country brands.

The

Dominican government has worked hard to build a brand categorized by beautiful beaches, allinclusive resorts, incredibly warm water and fruity cocktails (Antillean Media Group Report,
2016). At the inception of its tourism industry in 1967, the Dominican Republic devoted
extensive public capital to build its nation brand. To actively promote the development of its
tourism sector, the government passed the Tourist Law in 1971 to incentivize the private sector
to partner with the government to promote tourism. From that time to the present, both public
and private partnership investments to promote tourism have remained at high levels. According
to figures from the World Bank, the Dominican government devotes 22% of the country’s total
tourism expenditure (public investment) to tourism promotion (see Appendix R). In return, the
country’s brand is strong and tourism arrivals and receipts have been unprecedented compared to
other travel destinations within its region. The persistent high levels of nation branding in
relation to high increases of tourism arrivals and receipts is consistent with the theoretical
assumptions of this paper.
By contrast to the Dominican Republic, Haiti’s brand once developed as “Tropical Idle”
and the “Pearl of Antilles” deteriorated until recently when branding efforts were revitalized in
2012 to encourage potential visitors to consider “Why not, Haiti?” as their next travel
destination. Also, unlike the Dominican Republic, Haiti has historically devoted a much lower
percentage share of total tourism expenditure to tourism promotion. From data available from
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the World Bank, the country’s percentage share of total tourism expenditures that goes to
tourism promotion has been at 3% since 1999. According to the scale developed for nation
branding in this paper, this is a low investment for public expenditures on tourism promotion.
Regarding investments from the private sector, from 1945-1980, tourism promotion investment
from public-private partnerships was at moderate levels. However, during that time tourism
arrivals and receipts were moderate. After the country’s tourism sector deteriorated in 1986,
public spending on tourism promotion fell to all time low percentages (from 1.7-2% according to
World Bank figures available for 1995-1998; see Appendix H); and, public-private partnerships
to promote tourism also stagnated at low investment levels (see Appendix G). Recently, since
the late 2000’s, while public spending has remained at a low rate of 3% (Appendix H), tourism
promotion spending from public-private partnerships has been high (see Appendix G). The
higher levels of investments from the public-private partnerships have slowly begun to build a
more favorable country brand for the country as Haiti was included in the World Economic
Forum’s Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report rankings for the first time in 2013 (World
Travel and Trade Report, 2013). The country ranked last out of 140 countries in 2013; however,
its most recent ranking was 133rd out of 141 countries in 2015. Considering Haiti has not yet
built a sustainable brand, continued high levels of nation branding investments are necessary to
counteract the negative country brand reputation it has developed over the years.
Nation branding is effective when governments promote the most attractive
characteristics of its country to the right target market to achieve its goals for increasing tourism
arrivals and receipts. At the inception of their tourism industries, both the Dominican Republic
and Haiti promoted their brand to the mass tourism market for overnight visitors and cruise ship
passengers. While Dominican Republic has been historically successful in mass tourism for
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overnight visitors, trailing behind Haiti only in terms of cruise ship passengers, Haiti’s inability
to counteract its negative country brand image changed the dynamics of its target market. When
Haiti’s tourism sector stagnated in 1986, after the AIDS rumor and Duvalier coup, it began to
draw visitors only from its diaspora community. As a result, its low investment in promoting
tourism and the lack of priority in revitalizing tourism immediately after those crises pulled the
country away from the mass tourism market. The country’s success in cruise ships arrivals at
Labadee (Haiti’s small peninsular province) only resulted from the decrease in safety risk that
Labadee provided cruise passengers, as it was physically insulated from the areas in Haiti facing
political unrest. Unfortunately, the travel receipts from same day travelers produce lower
tourism receipts than that of overnight stays. Meanwhile, until 2011 when Haiti began
revitalizing its tourism market for overnight stays, the country projected a brand image of
poverty, having a weak infrastructure, and being constantly plagued by political instability to the
extent that it relied on aid to survive. The non-profit driven form of nation branding, attracted a
new niche market of overnight tourists in the form of aid workers, missionaries, and business
travelers. Unfortunately, this type of tourism promotion is incompatible with the high levels of
nation branding investment and positive marketing campaigns that are required to capture even a
small share of the mass tourism market. No longer the “Pearl of the Antilles”, from its mass
tourism market days that ended in 1986 (Fuller, 1999; Seraphin, 2011), country promotional
advertisements often projected Haiti as hopeless with the destination’s attractiveness only being
used to generate more fundraising capital (Antillean Media Group Report, 2016). As the country
has done since 2011, Haiti must continue to disburse higher levels of nation branding
investments to promote a positive image that is targeted to a smaller share mass market.
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3.3.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception
The findings in Figure 3.1. on the scaled ratings for all variables for Haiti, indicated that
for the public safety variable, while crime was low and stability was at moderate or unstable
levels (during 1940-1985), tourism arrivals and receipts were moderate at best; and higher
tourism arrivals and receipts were likely hampered by the random bouts of political instability or
unrest (during 1956-1957, 1961-1962 and 1982-1985). During those times, infrastructure
investment from public and public-private partnerships and direct spending from the private
sector (in terms of hotel accommodations such as the construction of Club Med and the Hyatt)
ranged from moderate to high levels. In addition, the country perception of the country was
positive until 1982 when travel destination sources reported that AIDS originated in Haiti and
political instability created a decline in tourism arrivals and receipts in 1984 (see Appendix I).
However, from 1983 to 2000, public safety in Haiti was at low levels due to the combination of
high crime and political instability. During this time, infrastructure spending was low (as public
and public-private partnerships diminished alongside the closing of many privately-owned
hotels).
Consistent with the low levels of public safety (indicating a security risk), low
infrastructure investment and low public spending on nation branding (cruise ship tourism
promotion was at moderate levels; but, this did not impact overnight travelers), tourism arrivals
and receipts were low. The stagnation of Haiti’s tourism sector at that time is consistent with the
theory of this paper as low levels in each variable were insufficient to counteract the negative
country perception that had formed globally. In the final period covered in this paper, 20012016, public safety has remained low overall due to high (critical according to OSAC reports)
levels of crime and political instability. However, infrastructure investment (public & public-
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private partnerships along with direct private investment in terms of hotel accommodations)
increased to high levels in late 2010 due to the earthquake that hit Haiti. Moreover, nation
branding efforts have been at high levels (not from public spending on tourism promotions; but,
from private investors).
Despite the public safety levels, indicating a high threat of security risk, higher levels of
consistent increases in tourism arrivals and receipts were evident starting in 2013. Recent media
sources (travel blog and reviews) reported that any overnight visitors indicate that the reason for
their stay in Haiti was for vacation purposes, not aid or missionary work, thereby indicating the
country’s small penetration into the mass tourism market (Walton, 2016). Also, during the 20012016, while the overall country perception remains negative, some favorable reviews and reports
have begun to describe Haiti as safe and appealing to visit as other travel destinations in the
Caribbean. The implication of this slight reversal in country perception is that the higher levels
of infrastructure investment and nation branding are working to counteract the negative image of
the country.
Likewise, according to the findings in Figure 4.1. on the scaled ratings for all variables on
the country, the Dominican Republic also demonstrated that there were countereffects of high
levels of investments in infrastructure and nation branding on public safety levels in terms of
generating increases in tourism arrivals and receipts. Like crime in Haiti (since 1986), crime has
been high in the Dominican Republic (since 1961) with only a moderate level of political
stability as the differentiator between the two countries for the public safety independent
variable. The countereffects appear higher for the Dominican Republic as it has a long history of
high investment in infrastructure and nation branding, thereby contributing to its positive country
perception by the global community. However, as discussed above, Haiti’s recent nation
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branding investments have produced strong destination marketing promotions which are
beginning to be discussed in travel destination sources.
The main question of this study is what difference does the government institutions of
Haiti and the government institutions of the Dominican Republic make for tourism growth, in
terms of increases in arrivals and receipts? I believe this study provides a clear answer, even
with the findings that crime does not have as great an impact on tourism arrivals and receipts as
expected when interacting with nation branding and infrastructure. Each of the independent
variables of this paper represents an area where government institutions in each country can
effectively manage functional benefits (such as providing security for and promoting the
existence of safety police to tourists as well as quality infrastructure) to generate increases in
tourism arrivals and receipts.
Public safety is managed by each country’s national police. Whereas it was previously
discussed that Haiti’s national police underreported crime, experienced policing challenges and
needed the assistance of MINUSTAH to help raise the stability level in the country after 2004,
the Dominican Republic (who also had a previous problem underreporting crime) has
demonstrated better governance in this area. As part of its tourism development, the country
passed legislation to provide special tourist police as a branch of the country’s Ministry of
Defense.
The Dominican Republic has an effective Ministry of Tourism. The special tourism
forces were formerly a branch of the tourism department of the country; however, after the role
of the tourist police was expanded, it was transferred to the department of defense. However,
both ministries work to assure tourists of the presence of security within the country.
Information about the special police is included in the country’s tourism promotion literature.
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As a result, any travel destination information a potential traveler might receive to indicate that
the Dominican Republic is unsafe is counteracted by direct promotional information from the
country’s Ministry of Tourism that their safety is assured.
In assessing whether the country has been effective in building a country brand that
projects a positive image, the evidence lies in the information that potential travelers receive
from the Dominican Republic that they interpret as positive. During my research on country
image perception, I discovered several travel destination information sources advising potential
travelers about the country’s special tourist police. Many travel reviews, travel guides and mass
media reports assured visitors that the tourist police were specifically placed in areas most
frequented by travelers.
In addition to its tourism ministry and security forces, the Dominican Republic has better
governance in terms of its infrastructure investment. While Haiti has had repeated challenges
completing infrastructure projects and securing higher levels of disbursement from its publicprivate partnerships, the Dominican Republic has a high level of partnership investment from the
private sector. The country has a strong central bank with a division (INFRATUR) that was
created at the start of its tourism sector development to specifically to fund infrastructure
projects. INFRATUR receives private sector investments, as well as disburses public-private
partnership and public funding to successfully complete the country’s infrastructure projects.
Furthermore, the country has several all-inclusive resorts located in designated tourism zones.
The designated tourism zones were tax incentives created by law to encourage private sector
development and infrastructure improvement. The designated tourism zones are protected by the
special tourist police forces to insulate travelers from high crime areas throughout the country.
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4

CONCLUSION

For the test countries in this study, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, I examined how
effective their government institutions were in providing functional benefits, such as public
safety and infrastructure investment, as part of their country brand offering to satisfy the demand
of their target market of potential travelers. I theorized that higher levels of the independent
variables, public safety (which was comprised of political stability and crime rates),
infrastructure investment (comprised on public, public-private partnerships and private sector
investment {hotel rooms}) and nation branding worked to create a positive brand image. The
favorable country brand is what countries promote to potential travelers to influence their travel
decisions, as well as counteract any negative travel destination information they may receive
from outside sources. Countries that were successful would experience a rise in international
tourism arrivals and receipts. Considering the literature had already established an individual
correlation between political stability, infrastructure investment and nation branding with
tourism demand, I expected that my newly operationalized independent variables and dependent
variable would indicate a better causal relationship to explain how countries generate increases
in tourism arrivals and receipts.
My findings were not entirely as expected. Political stability, one of the variables used to
measure the level of public safety in each test country, was the only variable which produced a
strong causal relationship with the dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts. For the
Dominican Republic, its period of political instability preceded the formal inception of its
tourism sector development in 1967. As a result, tourism inflows were virtually nonexistent;
and, the first recorded set of arrivals was 230 visitors in 1930 (see Appendix T.1). However,
around 1971, when the country began experiencing the moderate levels of political stability that
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exists presently, the increases in tourism arrivals and receipts in the Dominican Republic have
consistently remained at high levels.
Generally, over the different tourism periods for both countries, I observed that whenever
political instability was evident, tourism arrivals and, in most times, receipts declined
significantly. Furthermore, when both countries transitioned from a period of instability to
moderate levels of political stability, the tourism arrivals and receipts increased to high levels.
The exception to that finding was during Haiti’s most recent tourism period (2011-2016), during
which the government took steps to revitalize tourism with extensive infrastructure and nation
branding public and public-private sector investments. During that time, crime (the other
measure for public safety) was high; and, the country was classified as unstable (at a percentile
rank ranging from 17.54/100 in 2011 to 22.38/100 in 2016—see Appendix B) according to the
levels on political stability described under the World Governance Indicators on “Political
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” that I used to determine the level of security risk
in each country. However, over the 2011-2016 period, Haiti experienced an average 13.9%
increase in tourism arrivals (see Appendix J.4) was over 5 times the annual average (2.7%)
increase for arrivals in the Caribbean region. During 2011-2016 period, tourism receipts grew an
average of 3% for Haiti, about less than 1% of the annual average for receipts in the Caribbean
(see Appendix J.5). The unexpected outcome indicated that there was likely an additive effect
coming from the inclusion of the other independent two variables in my theoretical framework,
which I will discuss further in this conclusion.
For my intervening variable, country image perception, the outcomes were mostly as
expected for both countries. Country image perception for both Haiti and the Dominican
Republic were directly impacted by information pertaining to the political stability level of the
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country. In nearly every instance, when each country was categorized as unstable, then the rate
of arrivals and receipts declined. When at least a moderate level of stability existed in both
countries, they each experienced high levels of increase in arrival and receipts. For the
Dominican Republic, the outcomes were in line with previous findings from the literature on
tourism demand and the theory of this paper. When the country image perception was negative
("comic opera prototype of Caribbean instability" (Fodor, 1960), then arrivals and receipts were
at low levels. However, since the perception of the country has been positive since 1970’s,
increases in arrivals and receipts have been high. In Haiti’s case study, the findings were not as
distinct. During the 1940-1980 and 1981-2010 periods, when country image perception was
positive (Haiti was described by a 1976 New York Times article as “exotic and fascinating,
possessed of a rich culture, a tempestuous past and a smiling, friendly populace”35), the country
experienced high increases in arrivals and receipts (see Table 3.1). Predictably, when perception
of the country was negative (according to the 1994 Baltimore Sun article “Haiti has been so
messed up for so long, it can't even do tourism anymore”36), tourism was negatively impacted as
tourism arrivals and receipts declined by -30% for the entire period (see Table 3.1). However, in
Haiti’s most recent tourism period, the country image perception is still negative (a 2012 L.A.
Times article was entitled “For troubled Haiti, tourism is a tough sell”37). Despite this, the
country experienced a high increase in arrivals (see Table 3.1 and Appendix J.5) and tourism
receipts were just slight under the regional average. As country image perception, from the
demand side (i.e. potential travelers), is influenced by travel destination information sources, the
results for Haiti indicated that it was possible that information was coming from the supply side
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https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/21/archives/whats-doing-in-haiti.html
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-10-09/news/1994282027_1_haiti-club-med-luisetti
37
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/22/business/la-fi-haiti-tourism-20121122
36
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(i.e. the potential travel destination) that could explain the difference in Haiti’s case. The
outcome revealed that there was an impact from the independent variables that seemed to bypass
the normal effects of the intervening variable, country image perception, on the level of arrivals
and receipts.
For both countries, during my analysis, there were periods where a correlated relationship
was predictably evident between individual independent variables and the dependent variable,
tourism arrivals and receipts. However, for the public safety independent variable, my findings
indicated that crime rate levels did not appear to impact tourism arrivals and receipts as expected.
As a security measure, no apparent causal relationship with tourism arrivals and receipts could
be determined in the case study analyses for Haiti or the Dominican Republic. It appeared that
there were times that high levels of crime were correlated with low levels of tourism arrivals and
receipts. Alternatively, there were times when crime was at low levels in a period while
increases in tourism arrivals and receipts were high. However, after evaluating the tourism
periods for both cases, crime proved not to be a causal factor. Case studies for both countries
showed that high percentages of arrivals and receipts were generated during periods when crime
was high (see Tables 3.1. for Haiti and 4.1 for the Dominican Republic).
To explore this puzzle further, I examined the individual impact of the remaining two
variables in my theoretical equation and their impact on tourism arrivals and receipts in both
Haiti and the Dominican Republic. For Haiti, there were varied levels of public spending,
public-private partnerships and private sector investments in infrastructure throughout each
period of their tourism sector development. Despite the different levels of investment, they did
not create any apparent variations on the dependent variable in each period. In one period (19812010), there was a general correlation between infrastructure investment and tourism arrivals and
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receipts. During that period, low levels of public spending, public-private partnerships and
private sector investments in infrastructure corresponded to low levels of tourism arrivals and
receipts. However, that relationship was not as clear in the previous period (1940-1980) where
similar low levels in public and public-private partnerships still generated a high increase over
time in arrivals between years where figures were available (24% in 1950, followed by 41% in
1956 and 6% in 1960-see Appendix J.1). Tourism receipts for 1960 indicated a 14% increase
over time from 1950 figures (see Appendix J.2). Furthermore, despite public and public-private
private sector investment in infrastructure being at moderate levels during this period (19401980), tourism arrivals declined in 1963 and dropped to -24% for tourism arrivals and -53% for
tourism receipts from previously recorded figures (see Appendices J.1 and J.2). This meant that
changes in the level of another independent variable was likely creating that variance.
For the Dominican Republic, infrastructure investments for public and public private
partnerships and private sector investment have consistently been at high levels since the
beginning of their tourism sector (see Table 4.1). As tourism arrivals and receipts have been at
high levels for the Dominican Republic during each of their tourism periods, infrastructure
investment does appear to have a positive correlated relationship with the dependent variable.
This is expected and in line with previous literature on tourism demand determinants as well as
the theory of this paper.
For the nation branding independent variable, the impact of public tourism promotion and
public-private tourism promotion in terms of generating tourism arrivals and receipts varied
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. For Haiti, between 1940 and 1980, public tourism
promotion was low; however, public-private tourism promotion was at a moderate level. Despite
the low level of public tourism promotion, it appeared that a moderate level of public-private
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tourism promotion was sufficient to produce high levels of tourism arrivals and receipts (see
Table 3.1). During the next period (1981-2010), when public and public-private tourism
promotions were both at low levels, tourism arrivals were at low levels as expected. In Haiti’s
final tourism period, public tourism promotion was low while public-private tourism promotion
was high; and, this resulted in a high level of tourism arrivals while tourism receipts were at low
levels (see Table 3.1). For the Dominican Republic, public and public-private tourism promotion
were both low at the beginning of their early tourism period (1961-1980). Tourism arrivals and
receipts did not begin experiencing increase until after public and public-private tourism
promotion reached high levels (after 1967 for public tourism promotion and 1971 for publicprivate partnerships-see Table 4.1). Therefore, some level of nation branding is strongly
correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts. However, a causal relationship between nation
branding and tourism arrivals and receipts is not as evident as it is with political stability.
The results of my intervening variable, country image perception, helped clarify the
nature of the relationships between the independent variables of this paper. In terms of
interaction between the independent variables in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, I observed
that when either country experienced political instability and a low level of public safety (where
crime and instability simultaneously existed as in Haiti’s case), high levels of infrastructure
investment and nation branding (only high levels of public-private tourism promotion for Haiti)
appeared to offset the perception of the security threats. This is where the previously discussed
outcomes, for country image perception, indicated that certain variables were interacting to offset
any negative information being provided to outbound potential travelers (which often deterred
their decision to travel). However, despite the potential threat that a high crime level and
political instability in Haiti could pose, tourists still chose to visit Haiti during the 2011-2016.
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However, it was unclear whether the overcompensation was based on a combination of high
levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding; or, if high rates of one variable was
creating the overcompensation. It was not determined if the high level of nation branding (or a
high level of one component of it), as the promotional component of my theory, was sufficient to
offset the perception of security risk for travelers.
For Haiti, the public spending measure of the nation branding independent variable,
remained at low levels for Haiti across all time periods; however, moderate levels of the publicprivate component of the nation branding seemed sufficient to help counteract the negative
country image impact that political instability caused during 1940-1980 period. After the
political instability period passes, the country image perception intervening variable becomes
positive. This indicates that a moderate level of investment in public-private tourism promotion
in Haiti can be sufficient to impact perception. However, in comparing the interactions between
the variables in both cases, the country image perception only changed from negative to positive
when political stability was moderate and nation branding investment was at least moderate in
one of its variables (public-private promotion in Haiti’s case). The same type of additive effect
between the three variables existed in the Dominican Republic, at its early stage of tourism
development; however, the investment in both components of nation branding and infrastructure
investment were high, while political stability remained at moderate levels. The sustainability of
this additive relationship indicates: 1) that with high levels of nation branding and infrastructure
investment, and moderate political stability, governments can create a favorable country brand;
2) the country brand is strong enough to project a positive country image that generates high
levels of tourism arrivals and receipts - even when the crime rate is high.
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While my hypothesis tests were not completely confirmed (as I predicted all three
independent variables would be high to generate a high increase tourism arrivals and receipts),
my theoretical framework concerning the necessary, additive relationship between my
independent variables, and their ability to influence country image perception by providing
functional benefits (reduction of security risk via at least moderate stability and infrastructure) to
generate tourism arrivals and receipts is confirmed. What this means is that government
institutions can effectively manage the level of security risk by providing adequate infrastructure
that insulates travelers from unsafe conditions created by crime and/or some level of political
instability. For example, the Dominican Republic has the all-inclusive resorts which provide
amenities to travelers to the extent that they do not have to leave the resort to enter areas were
crime may be prevalent. In addition, the country provides and promotes their special tourism
police. The Dominican Republic has done this successfully due to its level of governance, as
well as the effectiveness of their Ministry of Tourism, their Ministry of Defense and other
institutions which collaboratively work together to provide those type of functional benefits.
Future studies on tourism development or demand should expand the number of
independent variables to determine the level of governance for their test countries. Moreover,
political stability should be treated independent of crime rates or solely as a determinant of
security risk. In this study, because I was measuring for public safety, I only used the World
Governance Indicators (WGI) for political stability/absence of violence. However, the key
difference between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is their political stability levels in terms of
effective governance and institutional strength, not occurrences of violence. The success in
governance for the Dominican Republic is because it had fewer regime changes than Haiti, who
had 18 governments in a less than 30 years. The frequent change of governments makes it
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difficult to produce policies that require continuity, persistent investment, extensive planning,
and financial accountability as tourism development does. In recent years, studies show that
Haiti’s level of governance has increased, even if the global community still classifies the
country as “unstable” from the political instability/absence of violence perspective. Expanding
the literature in the future would be helpful in seeing the variance levels of stability in Haiti and
countries like it. The theoretical framework I provide in this study allows for future scholarship
to build upon my arguments to provide further explanations for how governments can effectively
manage their country brand, tourism development and global perception to generate increases in
tourism arrivals and receipts.
The findings of this study also produced a unique problem concerning the measurement
of crime rates for public safety, a main independent variable of this paper, and its impact on
tourism arrivals and receipts. This quandary serves as an opportunity for further studies to
provide more concrete explanations for the variance concerning what creates the perception of a
threat to safety in this paper’s findings. While political stability is used as a common measure
for security risks, I expected that including the crime rate as a variable for public safety would be
an even more important indication of the level of security risk in each country.
In conclusion, this study highlighted the issue of underreported crime and the lack of
national crime statistics system in many countries. The scarcity of reliability of crime data
information explains why literature on tourism demand determinants tends to exclude it as a
measurement for security. Political instability is widely reported by most country’s media
sources. Therefore, travel warnings or information about the volatile environment within a
foreign destination is more accessible. To advance the literature in this area, there are several
variables that can be used to determine why crime is underreported and how it impacts travel
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safety when tourists are given misinformation about crime abroad. For destinations where crime
is being or has been underreporting, it will be important to look at corruption levels, governance,
the strength of and reliability of the country’s security institutions (such as their national police).
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APPENDICES
Appendix A - Public Safety/Crime Rate Level (Haiti)
Time
Period38

Major Crime Incidents


1940-1960

1961-1980


1981-2000




2001-201640

38

Haiti’s military (Forces Armees d'Haiti—FAd'H)
inadequately polices the country as Haiti has no national
police force
Haitian government continually reports Haiti is “free of
crime”39
1986-crime levels are continually reported as “rising”
(through the 2000s) and undermines the Fad’H
credibility
1990s—Haiti tries to build its national police force to
combat severe security and crime problems (police force
starts in 1989)
2001—2016:
o Kidnappings (until 2013), homicides, car jackings
and robberies are a major crime concern
o Haiti’s overall crime rate is classified as “high” but
considered lower than other countries in its region
mainly due to a lack of mass tourism and continued
“underreporting” (especially of homicide rates
2007-2011)
o 2010—Nearly 5,000 prisoners escaped from the
national penitentiary during the earthquake and only
25% are recaptured
2014—2017: Kidnappings are diminishing (especially
incidents against American victims)
See homicide (and other crime rate, as available, for
Haiti in Appendix B)

Reported Crime
Rate Level

Low
Low

Low (reported until
1985)
High (since 1986)

High
(But, OSAC repeatedly
reports as Critical41)

Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Consolidated Problem Set version 2016,
https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/Dominican%20RepublicRN1.2.pdf
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_1.pdf and
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_4.pdf?ver=2012-10-11163239-190
39
Report that Haiti is crime free: Country Report, 2001 and NY Times article (1976)
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/21/archives/whats-doing-in-haiti.html
40
Based on OSAC (2006-2018) Reports
41
Based on OSAC (2006-2018) reports that classify crime rate levels as “critical” mainly based on the homicide rates and other
violent crimes such as kidnappings, rapes, assaults, shootings and carjackings
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Appendix B - Public Safety/Crime Rate Graphs (Haiti)

Homicide Estimates in Haiti
Number of Homicides

2,500
2,000

1,970

2,130
1,870

1,707 1,710 1,759
1,450

1,500

1,200

1,000

795
490 498

500

914

1,033

914

1,132 1,071

1,029

602

0
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Years reported (1996-2016)

Appendix B.1 Other types of crime prevalent in Haiti

CRIME RATES IN HAITI (2003-2013)
Kidnappings
3500
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2500
2000
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500
0
Kidnappings

Rape

2003

2006

93

540

Assaults

2007

2008

Robberies and Thefts

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

36

63

293

309

73

121

159

Rape

149

284

271

310

487

Assaults

243

724

1528

1853

2,985

Robberies and Thefts

160

1052

2007

1285

1,946

Category scale for crime level (based on number of homicide or crime incidents)

Number of Incidents
0-500
501-1000
1001-2000
2001-above

Crime Rate Level
Low rate of crime
Moderate rate of crime
High rate of crime
Very high rate of crime
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Appendix C - Public Safety/Political Stability Index (Haiti)
Time
Period42

1930-1960

1961-1980

1981-2000

2001-2017

42

Incidents threatening political stability
 1956 - Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier seizes power in military
coup and is elected president (his violent regime lasts from 19561971).
 1958 - Creation of violent paramilitary force Volontaires de la
Sécurité Nationale (VSN) known as the Tontons Macoutes
following coup attempt against François Duvalier
 1960 - Upper-class Haitians gradually leave Haiti to
flee Duvalier’s dictatorship
 1961- Jacques Stephen Alexis’ failed Communist coup against
Duvalier; Alexis is tortured than murdered
 1976 - Widespread protests against the repression of the nation's
press take place
Between 1986 and 2014, Haiti had 18 regime changes/changes of
government
 1982 – 1985
o Political unrest begins against Duvalier’s dictatorship; food
riots against poverty turn towards the government; students
killed in Gonaives spark angry major demonstrations against
the government (plus AIDS rumor starts in 1982)
 1986 – Jean Claude “Baby Doc” who succeeded his father, “Papa
Doc” in 1971 flees Haiti in the wake of the discontent started in
1982; and is replaced by Lieutenant-General Henri Namphy
 1988 - Leslie Manigat becomes president, but is ousted in a coup
led by Brigadier-General Prosper Avril, who installs a civilian
government under military control.
 1991 - Populist priest Jean Bertrand Aristide, elected president by
large majority, is unwilling to govern within political system and
alienates elite and foreign community. He is overthrown and
replaced by military-supported puppet government.
 1999-2000 - Following two years of stalemate between the
executive and the opposition-led legislature, President Preval
dissolves the legislature and rules by decree. Preval uses
unchecked executive power to ensure victories for his party,
Fanmi Lavalas, in 2000 legislative and presidential elections.
WGI Political stability estimates– see Appendix D for WGI political
stability estimates
WGI percentage rank estimates during this time range from 0-100%
on the political stability/absence of violence scale. The closer to
100%, the more stable the country. Stability is rated as unstable due
to the low score range Haiti has achieved.

Stability
Level43

Moderate
(1930-1955)
Unstable
(1956-1960)
Unstable
(1961-1971)
Moderate
(1972-1980)

Moderate
(1981-82)
Unstable
(1983-2000)

Unstable

Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Consolidated Problem Set version 2016,
https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/Dominican%20RepublicRN1.2.pdfhttps://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/
Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_1.pdf and
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_4.pdf?ver=2012-10-11163239-190; https://larevueindigene.wordpress.com/reference/chronology-of-haitian-history/
43 Represents the level of stability during the period, except as noted
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Appendix D - Public Safety: Political Stability Percentile Rank (Haiti)

Haiti Political Stability/Absence of Violence
Percentile Rank (0-100)

30.00
25.00
20.00

26.46

25.12 24.29

22.87

21.33
18.09

22.38 22.38

18.01 18.01 17.54
14.29

15.00

11.06

10.00

10.63 10.63 10.58
3.88 4.85

5.00
0.00

1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Time Period: 1996-2016

Category scale (the closer to 100%, the more stable the country)
Percentile Rank (0-100%)

Political Stability Level

0-49%

Unstable

50-89%

Moderately Stable

90-100%

Stable

Political Stability Level Definition
Active Incidents of violence, political unrest and
political instability
No major incidents; but, there may be some
random political unrest or temporary instability
incidents
No threat of major incidents, political unrest,
violence and political instability is unlikely
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Appendix E - Infrastructure Investment/Public and Private Sector (Haiti)
Time
Period44
1930-1960

1961-1980

1981-2000

2001-2017

Infrastructure Investments (PPI=public private
partnerships in infrastructure)
 1915-1934: U.S. occupation brings the building of
infrastructure (roads, bridges, canals, public buildings,
telecommunication, water and sewage)
 1956: Haiti receives a $2.6 million loan from World
Bank to improve its transportation infrastructure (725
miles of primary and secondary roads)

Investment
Type
Combination:
 Public &
PPI

 Number of Hotel Rooms: under 2,000
Private
 1970-1980s ($300 million-adjusted for inflation):
o Paved road project constructed among Haiti’s major
cities & secondary road is built in rural areas (Route
de l’Amitie Franco-Haitienne)
o Improvements in electricity, telecommunication,
airfreight facilities in Port au Prince; construction of
Combination:
two industrial parks
o Secondary road project funded by USAID, World
 Public &
Bank, and IDB
PPI
 Number of Hotel Rooms: approx. 3,000 including Club
Med & the Hyatt (by 1980)
Private
 Secondary road project funded by USAID, World
Bank, and IDB
Public
 Number of Hotel Rooms:
o 3,000 (by 1981)
o 800 (by 1999) - Club Med closed in 1986, reopened
Private
in 1997; but, closed for good in 1998
 2001-2007: $129,720,000 allocated (infrastructure
improvement); but, only $37,890,000 executed
 Post 2010 earthquake:
o $1.4 billion granted by U.S. Congress for
reconstruction USAID pledges $651 million ($203
million disbursed by 2013)
o Vietnam telecommunication company, Viettel,
grants nearly $100 million to upgrade infrastructure
 2013-2015: $260 million Ile-la- Vache project
Combination:
proposed, then halted - land ownership dispute
 2017: Infrastructure investment proposed by China $30  Public &
PPI
billion proposed; but not yet received
 Number of Hotel Rooms:
o 2,000 (2010); but over 4,322 (by 2015);
o Minister of Tourism claims 9,280 hotel rooms
[including 4,861 of classified rooms of international
Private
standard 1 to 5 hibiscus, in 177 hotels]

Investment
Level
Moderate:
 High
(19301941)
 Low
(19421960)
Moderate

High
Moderate
Low

Low

High (allocatedbut only
about 40%
disbursed)

High

44 1930-1941 Country Report, 2001; 1930-2017 on Public & PPP infrastructure investments (Preeg-Haitian Dilemma, 1996) and
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-extends-her-silk-road-to-haiti_us_5984927ae4b0bd8232029723
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Appendix F - Infrastructure Investment/PPIs (Haiti)

Investment in Millions ($)

Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)
Haiti Public-Private Partnerships
1990-2014
$80

$67
$57

$60

Electricity
ICT (Info and Communications)

$40

Ports
$20
$1
$0

$1

Water and Sewage

Total Investment by Sector

Public-Private Partnerships/Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) in Haiti
Number of
Total Investment
Projects
(in Millions)
Investment Level
Projects by sector
Electricity
3
$67 Low
ICT (Information and Communications)
2
$1 Low
Ports
1
$57 Low
Water and Sewage
1
$1 Low

Category Scale of PPI Investment
Infrastructure PPI (in Millions)
$0-500
$501-1000
$1,001-up

Investment Level in infrastructure
Low level of investment
Moderate level of investment
High level of investment
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Appendix G – Nation Branding/Public and Private Tourism Promotion (Haiti)
Time
Period45
1940-1980

46

1981-2011

2011-2017

45

Nation Branding/Public & Private Tourism
Promotion
 A 1973 Organization of American States
(OAS) Audit Report indicates that Haiti’s
tourism promotion budget has been poorly
allocated—60% of the total budget goes to
the salaries of a large staff in the National
Tourist Office-only a small amount for
promotion, public relations, publicity and
literature (public investment)
 Private marketing funding from Pan Am,
American Airlines and hotels
 1982: Haiti is associated with AIDS
 1980s: Tourism offices closed in 5 cities
globally and promotion diminished
 By 1986, there was no Ministry of Tourism
 1990s: Allocated budget for tourism
diminishes as tourism stagnates
2000s-2011:
 Cooperative-American Airlines proposes
$25K marketing promotion partnership
(public-private)
 Royal Caribbean invests $5 million to
develop & market cruise tourism in Labadee
(public-private)- but briefly suspends cruises
after Aristide is overthrown in 1991
 Funding from the OAS to revitalize tourism
($300K)
 Haiti appoints a new Minister of Tourism
 Extensive branding begins in Haiti
 “Why Not Haiti” slogan -beyond just cruise
tourism promotions
 Haiti begins to be included in the Global
Competitiveness index (2015); but, is ranked
low for tourism marketing promotions
 IADB/MIF Funding for tourism projects
 Center for Facilitation of Investments (CFI)
in Haiti facilitates public-private tourism
promotion in Jacmel, Ile La Vache and Cote
de Fer (est. $289 million USD)
 FDI-3 new luxury branded hotels built (Best
Western, Royal Oasis and Marriott) and
promoted to accommodate post-2010
earthquake travelers

Investment Type

Public
Public-private
tourism marketing

Investment
Level

Low
Moderate

Public-private
tourism marketing

Low
Low
(some cruise
ship-Haiti is
marketed as
“Labadee,
Hispaniola”visitors report
not knowing
they are in
Haiti)

Public

Low

Public-private
tourism marketing

High

Public

1940-1999 Country Report, 2001
Development Associates, Inc. Tourism Specialist Report (1986); World Bank Country Report (1987); IADB Haiti ReportDeveloping North Department, 2016, WEF Travel and Tourism Report, 2012-2018
46
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Appendix H – Nation Branding/Public Tourism Promotion Investment (Haiti)

% share of total tourism expenditure

Government spending on T&T in Haiti
(% share of total tourism expenditure)
3.5

3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0

3.0
2.5
2.0

2.1
1.7

1.7

2.0

1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0

Years (1995-2018)

Category scale for public tourism promotion investment (% share of total tourism
expenditure)
% share of total
tourism expenditure
0-9%
10-19%
20% - above

Nation branding/public investment on tourism promotion level
Low investment in tourism promotion
Moderate investment in tourism promotion
High investment in tourism promotion
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Appendix I – Haiti’s Country Image Perception Scale
Haiti Country Image Perception 1940-201847
Time
Travel Destination Information
Review of Travel Destination Information
Period Source
Source
1940Later sources reveal a perception that covers this
1949
Missing data
period
1950Later sources reveal a perception that covers this
1959
Missing data
period
Travel guide
 Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean
 Favorable – Haiti is viewed as “fascinating”
(1960)
1960with much to offer tourists (29-page review)
 New York Times article (1977)
1969
 Describes
Mass Media reports
Mass Media reports
 Sports Illustrated article (1973)
 Favorable on tourism surge in Haiti
 New York Times article (1974)
 Favorable on Haitian art (including souvenirs)
 New York Times article (1976)
 Favorable – Haiti is fascinating and safe
 People Magazine article (1977)
 Favorable – Baby Doc to undo father’s
damage
Travel guide
Travel guide
1970-  Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean
 Favorable—Haiti is still “fascinating” as
1979
1960s
(1974)
 Unfavorable--AIDS link to Haiti- tourism
decline
Mass Media reports
 Unfavorable--AIDS, instability causes decline
 New York Times article (1982)
 Favorable—Haiti still has allure for business
 Washington Post article (1984)
FDI
1980-  New York Times article (1984)
 Mixed—AIDS stigma killed tourism; FDI
 New York Times article (1986)
1989
hopeful
19901999

20002009

20102017
47

Mass Media reports
 Baltimore Sun article (1994)
 New York Times article (1995)
Mass Media reports
 BBC News (2004)
 Christian Science Monitor
(2008)
 The Independent-UK (2008)
 Reuters online article (2009)
 The Tyee (2009)
Mass Media reports
 World Nomad blog (2011)
 BBC article (2013)
 Haiti Hub website
 Lonely Planet (2015)
 USA Today (2018)
d bl (
)
Travel ld
guide (2016)
 Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean
Travel reviews:
TripAdvisor
Country Safety Rankings
 SafeAround (2017)
 UL Safety Index (2017)

 Unfavorable - Club Med Haiti’s loss of
tourists
 Favorable – Haiti tries to revive tourism
 Unfavorable – Haiti: an economic basket case
 Mixed – Haiti is safe; negative image hurts
tourism
 Mixed review -Haiti a mix of fun & poverty
 Favorable – Cruise ship boost tourism in Haiti
 Unfavorable – Haiti’s brand is cursed
Mass Media reports
 Unfavorable—Haiti has safety issues
 Unfavorable—safety warnings about Haiti
 Favorable—Haiti is as safe as others
 Favorable—on the best places to visit in Haiti
 Unfavorable—Advises Haiti is dangerous
f
bl – Haiti:
i hno longer included
id i in
 Unfavorable
Guide
 Favorable—travelers claim Haiti is as safe as
others



Unfavorable – Haiti is ranked 118/128
Unfavorable—Haiti: below average 40/100

The country image perception references are listed in a separate page in the Works Cited section of this thesis

Country
Perception
Positive
Positive
Positive
(1960-1963)
Negative
(1964-1969)

Negative
(1970-1971)
Positive
(1972-1980)

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative
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Appendix J – Tourism Arrivals and Receipts Graph (Haiti)
Appendix J.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (Haiti, 1940-1980):
Golden Tourism Period (1940-1980)

Haiti's Golden Tourism Period (1940-1980)
400,000

Number of international arrivals

350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0

0.24

0.41

0.06

0
1945
-50,000

1950

1956

1960

-0.24
1963

0.17
1972

0.13
1979

-0.11
1980

Total average tourism growth rate for period=13%
Number of International Arrivals

Tourism Growth Rate

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1940-1980)
Average rate of international arrivals
0-6.99%
7-9.99%
10% - above

Growth rate level
Low average growth rate for international arrivals
Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
High average growth rate for international arrivals
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Appendix J.2 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Tourism receipts (Haiti, 1940-1980):
Golden Tourism Period (1940-1980)

Haiti's Golden Tourism Period (1940-1980)
$40,000,000
$35,000,000
$30,000,000
$25,000,000
$20,000,000
$15,000,000
$10,000,000
$5,000,000

0

0.14

-0.53

0.41

0.23

0.12

$0
-$5,000,000

1950

1960

1963

1972

1979

1980

Total average tourism growth rate for period=14%
International tourism, receipts (current US$)

Tourism Growth Rate

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990)
Average rate of International receipts
0-9.99%
10-12.99%
13%- above

Growth rate level
Low average growth rate of international receipts
Moderate average growth rate of international receipts
High average growth rate of international receipts
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Appendix J.3 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (Haiti, 1981-2010):
Deprived Tourism Period (1981-2010)48

Haiti's Deprived Tourism Period (1981-2010)
450,000
400,000
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0

-0.03
-0.01
0.17 -0.04 2.57 -0.33 0.50 -0.34
-0.02 0.01
-0.08 -0.22 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.03
-0.01
-0.01 -0.03 -0.29
1981 1982 1983 1984 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

-50,000

Total average tourist growth rate for period= -0.30%
Number of International Arrivals

Tourism Growth Rate

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1980-1995)
Average rate of international arrivals
0-4.99%
5-7.99%
8% - above

Growth level
Low average growth rate for international arrivals
Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
High average growth rate for international arrivals

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1995-2016)
Average rate of international arrivals
0-2.69%
2.7-4.99%
5% - above

48

Growth level
Low average growth rate for international arrivals
Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
High average growth rate for international arrivals

Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region
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Appendix J.4 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (Haiti, 1981-2010):
Deprived Tourism Period (1981-2010)49

Haiti's Deprived Tourism Period (1981-2000)
$450,000,000
$400,000,000
$350,000,000
$300,000,000
$250,000,000
$200,000,000
$150,000,000
$100,000,000
$50,000,000
0.23 0.26 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01-0.03 0.00 -0.02-0.01-0.02 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.02 -0.01
$0
-$50,000,000

19811982198319841995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010

Total average tourism growth for period = 8%
International tourism, receipts (current US$)

Tourism Growth Rate

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990)
Average rate of International receipts
0-9.99%
10-12.99%
13%- above

Growth rate level
Low average growth rate of international receipts
Moderate average growth rate of international receipts
High average growth rate of international receipts

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1990-2000)
Average rate of International receipts
0-12.99%
13-17.99%
18%- above

49

Growth rate level
Low average growth rate of international receipts
Moderate average growth rate of international receipts
High average growth rate of international receipts

Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region
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Appendix J.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals and Receipts (Haiti, 2011-2016):
Rejuvenated Tourism Period (2011-2016)

Haiti's Rejuvenated Tourism Period
600000
400000

349000

349000

516000

465200

420000

200000
0.37

0.00

0.20

0.11

0.11

0
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Average tourism growth rate for period =13.9%
Number of International Arrivals

Tourism Growth Rate

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 2011-2016)
Average rate of international arrivals
0-2.69%
2.7-4.99%
5% - above

Growth rate level
Low average growth rate for international arrivals
Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
High average growth rate for international arrivals

Haiti's Rejuvenated Period (2011-2016)
$800,000,000
$600,000,000 $456,000,000

$546,000,000

$578,000,000

$609,000,000

0.03

0.01

0.01

$511,000,000

$447,000,000

$400,000,000
$200,000,000
0.03

0.00

-0.03

$0
-$200,000,000

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total average tourism growth for period=3%
International tourism, receipts (current US$)

Tourism Growth Rate

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 2000-2016)
Average rate of International receipts
0-3.89%
3.9-5.99%
6%- above

Growth rate level
Low average growth rate of international receipts
Moderate average growth rate of international receipts
High average growth rate of international receipts
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Appendix K - Public Safety/Crime Rate Level (D.R.)
Time
Period50

Major Crime Incidents Reported


1940-1960
o
1961-1980


1981-2000






2001-2017

50



Dictator Trujillo (1931-1961) uses the country’s national police force
for personal means and not a national institution
Drug trafficking, murder, rape, and robbery to fraud, counterfeiting,
and extortion are major concerns
1980-1990:
o Drug trafficking, murder, rape, and robbery to fraud,
counterfeiting, and extortion are still major concerns
o Government did not publish statistics on national occurrences of
crime but Santo Domingo papers regularly report crime
o Police works to crack down on crime
Crime common to tourists, i.e. "crimes of opportunity”51 are
prevalent: street robbery, pocket picking, credit card fraud, ATM
fraud, burglary and theft from vehicles; and, if the victim resists,
injury often results
Police response is poor
2013-2015: homicides decreased
2017: Global report lists Dominican Republic as one of the 9 highest
countries for crime (30.9 per 100,000 inhabitants)52 while 2017
reported crime as 14.9 per 100,000 inhabitants (see Appendix L) for
crime rate levels according to homicide incidents per year
See homicide levels for the Dominican Republic in Appendix L

Reported
Crime Rate
Level

Moderate
High

High

2001-2014:
High
(reported)
2015-2017:
Critical
(reported)

https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/Dominican%20RepublicRN1.2.pdf
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_1.pdf and
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_4.pdf?ver=2012-10-11163239-190 and OSAC Reports (2007-2018)
51
OSAC Report (2007)
52
https://dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2017/05/17/dominican-republic-among-worlds-10-homicide-leaders/ and
https://www.oyster.com/articles/51359-9-popular-tourist-destinations-with-surprisingly-high-murder-rates/
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Appendix L Public Safety/Crime Rate Graph (D.R.)

Homicides in the Dominican Republic
3,000
2,375
2,394
2,394
2,239
2,144
2,111

Number of Homicides

2,500

1,902

2,000

1,500

2,513
2,474

1,279
1,200
1,032
1,1211,066
1,095
1,038
1,007

2,285
1,990
1,810
1,6761,616
1,198

1,000

500

0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Years (1995-2015)

Category scale for crime level (based on number of homicide incidents)
Number of Incidents
0-500
501-1000
1001-2000
2001-above

Crime Level
Low rate of crime
Moderate rate of crime
High rate of crime
Very high rate of crime
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Appendix M – Public Safety/Political Stability Index (D.R.)

Time
Period53

1930-1960

1961-1980
1981-1995

1996-2016
54

53

Incidents threatening political stability
 Political instability existed prior to Rafael Leonidas Trujillo
Molina’s dictatorship and violence during the oppressive
regime (nearly 20,000 Haitians living in the Dominican
Republic are killed)
 1961: The assassination of de facto ruler Trujillo ends the
regime
 1963-1966: Military overthrows newly elected democratic
government, establishes junta, and restricts leftwing parties
 1965: Brief civil war between short-term president Juan
Bosch Gavifio's liberal constitutionalist party and the
conservative loyalist military factions. Insurrection by
supporters of the deposed president results in external
intervention in support of Wessin regime
 1970-1975: The Dominican military periodically conducted
operations to suppress insurgencies (insurgent groups were
nearly disbanded after 1978)
No major incidents reported
WGI Political stability estimates– see Figure 1 for WGI
political stability estimates
 WGI estimates during this time range from -0.07 in
1996 to 0.29 in 2016 based on a -2.5 to 2.5 political
stability scale. Stability is rated as low due to the low
score range the D.R. has achieved. This indicates that
the country has improved over time but that it maintains
low level of political stability

Stability Level

Moderately Stable

Unstable
(1961-1975)
Moderately Stable
(1975-1980)
Moderately Stable

Moderately Stable

Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Consolidated Problem Set version 2016,
https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/Dominican%20RepublicRN1.2.pdf
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_1.pdf and
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_4.pdf?ver=2012-10-11163239-190
54
WGI
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Appendix N – Public Safety/Political Stability Percentile Rank (D.R.)

Dominican Republic
Political Stability/Absence of Violence
60.00

50.00

54.98 54.98

44.97

Percentile Rank (0-100)

42.03
38.35

40.00
31.91

57.14

50.95

48.68
45.21

54.76

31.66

42.79

44.55 44.55

46.92

40.10

33.98

30.00

20.00

10.00

0.00
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Time Period (1996-2016)

Category scale (the closer to 100%, the more stable the country)
Percentile Rank (0-100%)

Political Stability Level
Unstable

0-49%
Moderately Stable
50-89%
90-100%

Stable

Political Stability Level Definition
Active Incidents of violence, political unrest and
political instability
No major incidents; but, there may be some
random political unrest or temporary instability
incidents
No threat of major incidents, political unrest,
violence and political instability is unlikely
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Appendix O – Infrastructure Investment/Public and PPP (D.R.)
Time
Period55
19301941

19421960
19611980

19812000

20012017

Infrastructure Investments
 Investments made in constructing roads, sanitation
systems, ports and schools. Dictator Trujillo is
active in improving the country’s infrastructure with
help from the United States during its occupation of
the country.
 Number of Hotel Rooms: under 1,000
 1950s: D.R.’s government invests public funds to
build an advance transportation infrastructure
 Number of Hotel Rooms: 1,000
 1970-1980s: D.R. government funded public works
extensively invests in the country’s physical
infrastructure
 1970s: D.R.’s newly formed INFRATUR (Department
of Investment and Infrastructure) was given $76
million (USD) in World Bank funds to develop a
malecon and other tourist infrastructure in Puerto
Plata
 Number of Hotel Rooms: 3,800 (by 1974)
 1980-1990s: Narrow roadways, which flood easily,
are improved in a large transportation infrastructure
project funded by funds from the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank to develop
better maintenance systems
 1990s: D.R. public works embarks on a major road
improvements project in Santo Domingo
 Number of Hotel Rooms:
o 8,562 rooms (by late 1980s)
o 21,500 (by 1991)
o 45,000 rooms (by 1999)
 2000s: The IMF approves the D.R.’s request for
special funding of $56 million (USD) to rebuild
infrastructure damage from Hurricane Georges
(which struck in 1999)
 See separate chart for exclusive public-private
partnership (PPP) projects 1990-2017
 Number of Hotel Rooms: 66,790 (by 2011)

Investment Type

Investment
Level

Combination:
 Public & PPI
Private

High
Low

Public
Private

High
Low

Public
Private

High
Moderate

Combination:
 Public & PPI

High

Private

High

Combination:
 Public & PPI
Private

High
High

55 1930-1999 Country Report, 2001: http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican Republic and Haiti Study_1.pdf
and Country Studies on Dominican Republic, 1999: http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm:
http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm; Barrera et al, 2007; and Meyer-Ardent et al, 1992; 2000-2017: PPP Index; 19902017: https://pppknowledgelab.org/countries/dominican-republic and https://www.isc.hbs.edu/resources/courses/moc-course-atharvard/Documents/pdf/student-projects/DominicanRepublic_TourismCluster_2007.pdf
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Appendix P - Infrastructure Investment/PPI (D.R.)
Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)
Dominican Republic Public-Private Partnerships
1990-2017
Investment in Millions ($)

$4,000

$3,660

$3,500
$3,000
$2,500

Airports

$2,000

Electricity

$1,500

$1,029

$1,000
$500

$542

$350

$0

Ports
Roads

Total Investment by Sector

Public-Private Partnerships: Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)
in the Dominican Republic
Projects by
Number of
Total Investment (in Millions)
Investment
sector
Projects
Level
Airports
3
$350
Medium
Electricity
22
$3,660
High
Ports
4
$542
Medium
Roads
4
$1,029
High
Category Scale of PPI Investment
Infrastructure PPI (in Millions)
$0-500
$501-1000
$1,001-up

Investment Level in infrastructure
Low level of investment
Moderate level of investment
High level of investment
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Appendix Q -Nation Branding/Public and Private Tourism Promotion (D.R.)
Time
Period

Nation Branding/Public & Private Tourism
Promotion

1940-198056

1981-201057

58

2011-2017

Investment
Level




Prior to 1967: Tourism was non-existent
1967-71: Government appoints a Ministry of
Tourism and tourism promotion begins after
passing of the 1971 Tourist Law to
incentivize private tourism promotion
 1979: Government allocates $2 million for
the international promotion of the country’s
“Come to the land that Columbus loved
best” campaign
 1970s-Initial private investment for the first
resort in Punta Cana leads to numerous
projects promoted in partnership with the
government
 Tourism promotion fund established between
the government and the National Hotel &
Restaurants Association
 INFRATUR, the D.R.’s Central Bank public
financing department funds the promotion
and completion of several tourism projects
 2000: A special fund is created to promote
tourism
 1980s: Spain-Dominican cooperative tourism
development project builds and promotes
many Spanish branded hotels




56

Investment Type

The World Economic Forum’s Travel and
Tourism Competitiveness Insight Reports
consistently ranks the Dominican Republic’s
public tourism promotion investment as high
(over 20% of total tourism expenditure)
Ecotourism projects -development and
promotion being funded by public-private
tourism marketing partnerships

Public

Low (prior to
1970)
High

Public-private
tourism marketing

High

Public

High

Public-private
tourism marketing

High

Public

High

Public-private
tourism marketing

High

1940-1980 sources: Country Report, 2001, Fuller, 1999; 1981-2011 sources: Fuller, 1999; UN Treaty, 1982;
1981-2011: IWRAW http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/iwraw/publications/countries/dominican_republic.htm; DR: Defying the Odds
Report, 2011; Tourism Cluster Report, 2012; Fawcett (2015); Caribbean Resource and Development Centre Report, 1988
58
2011-2017: WEF Travel and Tourism Report, 2012-2018; Ministry of Tourism Report (2010)
57
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Appendix R - Nation Branding/Public Tourism Promotion Investment (D.R.)

Government spending on T&T in the Dominican
Republic
(% share of total tourism expenditure)
35.0

30.0 29.2
% share of total tourism expenditure

26.5
25.0

24.2 24.3
21.1 21.4 21.6 21.7

20.9 21.0
20.3 20.5

21.1 21.2 21.3 21.5 21.6 21.7

21.8 21.9 22.0 22.1 22.2 22.3

20.0

15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0

Years (1995-2018)

Category scale for public tourism promotion investment (% share of total tourism
expenditure)
% share of total
tourism expenditure
0-9%
10-19%
20% - above

Nation branding/public investment on tourism promotion level
Low investment in tourism promotion
Moderate investment in tourism promotion
High investment in tourism promotion
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Appendix S - Dominican Republic’s Country Image Perception Scale

Dominican Republic (D.R.) Country Image Perception 1940-201859
Time
Period

Travel Destination Information
Source

Review of Travel Destination Information
Source

Perception
of Country

19401949

Missing data

Later sources reveal a perception that covers this
period

Negative

19501959
19601969

19701979

19801989
19901999
20002009

20102017

59

Missing data
Travel guide
 Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1960)
Mass Media reports
 New York Times article (1971)
 New York Times article (1977)
 New York Times article (1977)
 New York Times article (1977)
 New York Times article (1979)
 New York Times article (1979)
 New York Times article (1979)
Travel guide
 Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1974)
Mass Media reports
 New York Times article (1982)
 New York Times article (1984)
 New York Times article (1988)
 New York Times article (1988)
Mass Media reports
 The Independent -UK (1999)
 Caribbean Living Magazine (1999)
Mass Media reports
 US News & World Report (2000)
 The Independent-UK (2009)
Mass Media report
 Daily Mail -UK (2016)
Travel survey
 Canadian Omni Survey (2012)
Travel guide
 Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (2016)
Travel reviews
 TripAdvisor reviews
Country Safety Rankings
 SafeAround (2017)
 UL Safety Index (2017)

Later sources reveal a perception that covers this
period
 Unfavorable -D.R. viewed as unstable for travel
(review of the country is only 6 pages)
Mass Media reports
 Favorable about growing tourism sector
 Favorable about D.R. wooing tourists
 Favorable on happenings in the D.R.
 Favorable on D.R. investing in tourism
 Favorable of D.R.’s civil and political rights
 Favorable on D.R. being best kept secret
 Favorable on D.R.’s plan to develop tourism
Travel guide
 Favorable about revitalized tourism sector
Mass Media reports
 Favorable on rediscovering the D.R.
 Favorable on D.R. being safe for travel
 Favorable about D.R.’s tourism surge
 Favorable on hotels being built in the D.R.

Positive

 Favorable on D.R.’s booming tourism sector
 Favorable - D.R. is a best value destination

Positive

 Favorable - D.R. ranked safe to travel alone
 Favorable – review that D.R. is worth visiting
Mass Media report
 Unfavorable— D.R. has high murder rate
Travel survey
 Favorable –Of 1,002, 7/10 view D.R. as safe
Travel guide
 Favorable—D.R. is ideal for travel
Travel reviews
 Favorable—most reviewers view D.R. as safe
Country Safety Rankings
 Unfavorable -D.R. is ranked 106/128 for safety
 Favorable—D.R. is ranked average 59/100

The country image perception references are listed in a separate page in the Works Cited section of this thesis

Negative
Negative

Positive

Positive

Positive
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Appendix T - Tourism Arrivals and Receipts Graph (D.R.)
Appendix T.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals and Receipts (D.R., 1930-1980):
Pre & Early Tourism Period (1930-1980) 60

Dominican Republic Pre & Early Tourism Period (1930-1980)
400000
300000
137000

200000
100000

301070

285573

233000

230 0.00

0.17

0.19

0.07

0.05

0
1930

1971

1975

1979

1980

Total period growth rate for period = 16%
Number of international arrivals (per year)

Tourism Growth Rate

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1940-1980)
Average rate of international arrivals
0-6.99%
7-9.99%
10% - above

Growth rate level
Low average growth rate for international arrivals
Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
High average growth rate for international arrivals

Dominican Republic Early Tourism Period (1961-1980)
$200,000,000
$150,000,000
$100,000,000
$50,000,000
$0

$167,900,000
$130,800,000
$55,400,000
0.00

0.33

1975

0.28

1979

1980

Total period growth rate = 32%
International tourism, receipts (current US$)

Tourism Growth Rate

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990)
Average rate of International receipts
0-9.99%
10-12.99%
13%- above
60

Growth rate level
Low average growth rate of international receipts
Moderate average growth rate of international receipts
High average growth rate of international receipts

Pre-tourism period receipts are not available for 1930
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Appendix T.2 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (D.R., 1981-2000):
Rising Tourism Period (1981-2000)61
Dominican Republic Rising Tourism Period (1981-2000)
3500000
3000000
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
0.38

-0.06

0.17

-0.02

0.29

0.13

0.03

0.01

0.08

0.15

0.04

0.15

0.12

0
-500000

1985

1986

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Total average growth per period = 10%
Number of international arrivals (per year)

Tourism Growth Rate

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1980-1995)
Average rate of international arrivals
0-4.99%
5-7.99%
8% - above

Growth level
Low average growth rate for international arrivals
Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
High average growth rate for international arrivals

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1995-2016)
Average rate of international arrivals
0-2.69%
2.7-4.99%
5% - above

61

Growth level
Low average growth rate for international arrivals
Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
High average growth rate for arrivals

Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region
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Appendix T.3 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (D.R., 1981-2000):
Rising Tourism Period (1981-2000)62
Dominican Republic Rising Period of Tourism (1981-2000)
$3,500,000,000

$3,000,000,000

$2,500,000,000

$2,000,000,000

$1,500,000,000

$1,000,000,000

$500,000,000
0.00

0.22

0.04

0.12

0.17

0.26

0.25

0.11

0.05

0.22

0.13

0.18

0.03

0.15

0.15

$0
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1990 1991 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Total average growth for period = 15%
International tourism, receipts (current US$)

Tourism Growth Rate

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990)
Average rate of International receipts
0-9.99%
10-12.99%
13%- above

Growth rate level
Low average growth rate of international receipts
Moderate average growth rate of international receipts
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Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1990-2000)
Average rate of International receipts
0-12.99%
13-17.99%
18%- above

62

Growth rate level
Low average growth rate of international receipts
Moderate average growth rate of international receipts
High average growth rate of international receipts

Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region
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Appendix T.4 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (D.R., 2001-2016):
Golden Tourism Period (2001-2016)63

Dominican Republic Golden Tourism Period (20012016)
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63

Growth level
Low average growth rate for international arrivals
Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
High average growth rate for international arrivals

The category scale in this period starts at 1995 due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region
that started at that time. But, this time period covers the tourism period in the Dominican Republic

120

Appendix T.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (D.R., 2001-2016):
Golden Tourism Period (2001-2016)64

Dominican Republic's Golden Period of Tourism (2001-2016)
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Growth rate level
Low average growth rate of international receipts
Moderate average growth rate of international receipts
High average growth rate of international receipts

The category scale in this period starts at 1995 due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region
that started at that time. But, this period covers the tourism period in the Dominican Republic
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Appendix U – References for Country Image Perception (Haiti and D.R.)
Data Sources
Dominican Republic (1940-present)
1) 1940s-1950s
a. Missing data
2) 1960s
a. Travel guide information (negative review)
i. Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1960) incl. 9 pgs. on D.R. (negative review on
the Dominican Republic)
3) 1970s
a. Travel guide information
i. Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1970)—information on Dominican Republic
building its tourism sector (more positive than 1960 data)
b. Mass media reports (positive)
i. NYT article about D.R.’s tourism sector awaiting rediscovery (1971):
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/01/17/archives/dominican-republic-awaitsrediscovery-dominicans-await-rediscovery.html
ii. NYT article about D.R. wooing tourists:
https://www.nytimes.com/1977/02/07/archives/us-company-big-sugar-growernow-woos-tourists-in-caribbean.html
iii. NYT article about DR: https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/18/archives/whatsdoing-in-the-dominican-republic.html
iv. NYT DR-Tourist’s gamble (1977):
https://www.nytimes.com/1977/08/28/archives/a-capital-investmentdominican-tourist-gamble-dominican-republic.html
v. NYT article post-DR Best Kept Secret in Caribbean (1979):
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/11/archives/the-dominican-republicdominican-republic-best-kept-secret-in-the.html
vi. NYT article post-DR on list of countries with increased civil liberties and
political rights (1979): https://www.nytimes.com/1979/01/08/archives/surveysays-worlds-civil-liberties-have-increased-gain-in-dominican.html
vii. NYT-D.R. plans to increase tourism:
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/08/25/archives/after-a-year-dominicandemocracy-still-feeling-its-way-poverty-and.html
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Country Image Perception Data Sources (Dominican Republic, 1940-present)
1) 1980s
a. Travel Guide information
i. Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1980)
b. Mass media reports
i. NYT DR rediscovered:
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/21/travel/rediscovering-the-dominicanrepublic.html
ii. NYT DR safe: https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/08/nyregion/new-yorkday-by-day-a-tour-for-tourism.html
iii. NYT article-DR tourism surges (1988):
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/11/business/dominican-republictourism-surges.html
iv. NYT article: more hotel in DR being built (1988):
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/07/business/caribbean-savors-a-tourismboom.html
2) 1990s
a. Mass media reports
i. UK media report on DR-booming tourism:
https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/the-secret-life-of-merengue-island1046049.html
ii. Caribbean Living Magazine -DR is best value in the Caribbean:
http://www.caribbeanliving.com/caribe/DominicanRepublic.htm
3) 2000s
a. Mass media reports
i. US News & World report DR ranked 22 safe to travel alone and 46 in best
countries for travel: https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/solotravel-full-list
ii. Tourism Cluster in D.R. 2007 report (include some image stats):
https://www.isc.hbs.edu/resources/courses/moc-course-atharvard/Documents/pdf/studentprojects/DominicanRepublic_TourismCluster_2007.pdf
4) 2010s
a. Mass media report
i. Ministry of Tourism EcoTourism Dev. (2010)—incl. situation analysis of
DR image - http://open_jicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11999455_01.pdf
b. Travel Survey
i. Canadian Online Omni survey---D.R. is safe (2012)
c. Travel Reviews
i. Trip Advisor Reviews (2010-2018)
ii. https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowTopic-g147288-i27-k439705Is_the_Dominican_Safe_for_families_or_is_it_like_Jamaica_sDominican_Republic.html
d. Country Safety Rankings
i. SafeAround website (country danger ranking 2017)
https://safearound.com/americas/dominican-republic/Social Progress
Index: http://www.socialprogressindex.com/?tab=2&code=DOM
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Country Image Perception Data Sources (Haiti, 1940-present)
Haiti (1940- present)
1) 1940s-1950s
a. Missing data
2) 1960s
a. Travel Guide
i. Fodor’s Travel Guide to Caribbean (1960) incl. 29 pgs. on Haiti (positive
review)
3) 1970s
a. Mass Media Reports
i. Sports Illustrated - incl. report of tourism surge in Haiti (1973)
https://www.si.com/vault/1973/05/21/618336/to-hell-with-paradise
ii. US/NY Times report incl. Haiti’s art (1974)https://www.nytimes.com/1974/09/08/archives/haitian-primitives-from-artform-to-souvenirs-art.html
iii. US/NY Times report incl. safety (1976)https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/21/archives/whats-doing-in-haiti.html
iv. People Magazine report on Papa Doc instability/tourism impact (1977)http://people.com/archive/papa-doc-terrorized-and-pillaged-haiti-now-hisson-aims-to-undo-the-damage-vol-8-no-20/
b. Travel Guide
i. Fodor’s Travel Guide to Caribbean (1970)
4) 1980s
a. Mass Media Reports
i. NY Times report on impact of AIDs rumor on Haiti’s tourism (1983)https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/29/world/for-haiti-s-tourism-the-stigmaof-aids-is-fatal.html
ii. UK AIDs report on Haiti (attributed to tourist going to Haiti vs originating
there—confirms it’s rumor vs real-2008 re 1982):
http://www.progressio.org.uk/sites/default/files/HIV-AIDS-in-Haiti.pdf
iii. AIDs and Unrest Image cause tourism to drop (1984)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/06/13/riots-followliberalization-in-haiti/0bab2e94-47e5-4f4a-a2f175d7ecd7da0e/?utm_term=.00c352c61418
iv. US/NYT Haiti attractive for business (1984)
https://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/17/business/haiti-s-allure-for-usbusiness.html
v. NYT (1986) FDI industry hopeful post-Duvalier
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/17/business/duvalier-flight-leaves-haitiindustry-hopeful.html
b. Travel Guide
i. Fodor’s Travel Guide to Caribbean (1980)
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Country Image Perception Data Sources (Haiti, 1940-present)
5) 1990s
a. Mass Media Reports
i. Baltimore Sun article on Club Med Haiti’s loss of tourists (1994)
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-10-09/news/1994282027_1_haiti-clubmed-luisetti
ii. NYT on Haitian tourism (1995)https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/12/travel/travel-advisory-correspondent-sreport-haiti-makes-effort-to-revive-tourism.html
6) 2000s
a. Mass Media Reports
i. 2001 country report on Haiti’s non-existent tourism sector since 1990:
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x9800e/x9800e10.htm
7) 2010s
b. Mass Media Reports
i. World Nomad Blog report on Haiti’s safety, crime, and travel (2011 and
2018)
1. https://www.worldnomads.com/travel-safety/caribbean/haiti/haitisafety-tips
2. https://www.worldnomads.com/travel-safety/caribbean/haiti/haitihigh-crime-and-chaos
ii. BBC article on Haiti’s safety for travel (2013):
1. http://www.bbc.com/travel/story/20130110-is-haiti-safe-for-travellers
iii. Haiti Hub website (2013) Is Haiti Safe?:
1. https://haitihub.com/is-haiti-safe/
iv. Lonely Planet (2015)
1. https://www.lonelyplanet.com/haiti/travel-tips-and-articles/tenthings-to-know-about-visiting-haiti/40625c8c-8a11-5710-a0521479d2762896
c. Country Rankings
i. SafeAround website (country danger ranking-2017)
1. https://safearound.com/americas/haiti/
ii. Social Progress Index (2017)1. http://www.socialprogressindex.com/assets/downloads/scorecards/en/
HTI-Scorecard.pdf
d. Travel Reviews
i. Trip Advisor Reviews (2010-2018)
1. https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowTopic-g147306-i747-k11014825Haiti_Safe_in_2017-Haiti.html
2. https://www.tripadvisor.com/Tourism-g147306-HaitiVacations.html
e. Mass Media Reports
i. USA Today (2018): http://traveltips.usatoday.com/dangers-travel-haiti102649.html
ii. UK TraveSl Advice on Haiti (2018): https://www.gov.uk/foreign-traveladvice/haiti
iii. New Zealand Safe Travel report (2018): https://www.safetravel.govt.nz/haiti

